Brazilian Software Law: Building a Domestic Industry While Opening a Protected Market by Boyle, Michael
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
1-1-1993
Brazilian Software Law: Building a Domestic
Industry While Opening a Protected Market
Michael Boyle
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation




BRAZILIAN SOFTWARE LAW: BUILDING
A DOMESTIC INDUSTRY WHILE
OPENING A PROTECTED MARKET
MICHAEL BOYLE*
I. INTROD U CTIO N ....................................................... 282
II. BACKGROUND ............................. 284
A. Development of Brazil's Informatics Policy ........... 284
B. Regulation and Marketing of Software Before the 1987 Software Law 290
C. The Microsoft MS-DOS Case and Passage of the 1987 Software Law 293
III. THE 1987 SOFTWARE LAW ............................................ 297
A . C op y righ t .................... ......................... ..... .. 297
B. Market Reserve Provisions: The Similarity Test and National Distrib-
utor R equirem ent ............................. ................ . 300
IV. ANALYSIS: EVALUATING THE 1987 SOFTWARE LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION .. 303
A . C op yrigh t ............................................ ..... .. 303
1. The Software Market Before the 1987 Software Law ........... 303
2. Influence of the Law's Copyright Section ...................... 304
3. Resolution of Foreign Exchange Remittance Problems .......... 305
4. . Increasing Sophistication of the Brazilian Software Market ..... 308
5. Proposed Amendment to the Copyright Provisions of the Law .. 309
B. Market Reserve Provisions: The Similarity Test and National Distrib-
utor R equirem ent .............. ............................... . 310
1. T he Sim ilarity Test ........ .......................... ...... 310
a. Fears of Software Vendors .......................... ... 310
b. Administration of the Similarity Test ..................... 311
c. Proposed Amendment Eliminating the Similarity Test and
Posting Requirem ent .................................... 315
2. National Distributor Requirement ............................ 316
* B.A., Yale University (1979); M.A., University of London (1981); J.D., University of
Connecticut (1993). Chief Steward and Staff Attorney, Federation of University Employees,
New Haven, Connecticut.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
a. Impact of the Requirement ....... ....... .... ...... ... 316
b. Proposed Amendment to the National Distributor Provisions
of the L aw . . ....... .............. ........ 318
C. Application of the Software Market Experience to the Hardware Mar-
k et R eserve .. ................................................... 319
V. CONCLUSION .......................................... ......... .. 323
I. INTRODUCTION
The stakes are high in the struggle for control of Brazil's com-
puter industry. Brazil, the world's seventh largest computer mar-
ket and eighth largest economy outside the former communist
bloc,1 generates approximately $3 billion in sales per year.'
After World War II, Brazil sought to enhance the development
of its economy and technological base by adopting protectionist,
import substitution economic policies.' From the late 1970s,4 Brazil
actively restricted foreign participation in informatics-the Brazil-
ian tern, for com1puters and i1hi-techIifflly esleerri1Us.L Brazil at-
tempted to spur domestic development by limiting to Brazilian-
owned firms the right to manufacture and sell certain high-tech-
nology products.e This strategy is known as the "market reserve.".
In 1984, the Brazilian government formalized and extended the
market reserve with the passage of an Informatics Law.7 Software
became subject to regulation as part of the market reserve and as a
result, became very difficult to import.
Brazil achieved only limited success in building its domestic
1. Brazil- Computers and Peripherals, 1992 National Trade Data Bank: Market Re-
ports, Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, Brazil File.
2. Id.
3. Michael Schwimmer, A Brave New World for Informatics in Brazil, COMPUTER LAW.,
Dec. 1990, at 24 [hereinafter Schwimmer, Brave New World].
4. Anne Piorkowski, Brazilian Computer Import Restrictions: Technological Indepen-
dence and Commercial Reality, 17 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 619, 619 (1985); see also infra
notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
5. The Portuguese word informdtica denotes the gamut of high technology and infor-
mation technology, including telecommunications, computer hardware, computer software,
and data processing. See Mary S. White, Navigating Unchartered Waters: The Opening of
Brazil's Software Market to Foreign Enterprise, 25 STAN, J. INT'L L. 575, 575 n.1 (1989).
6. See Brazil's Informatics Policy Draws Fire from U.S. Industry, 33 Pat. Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) 531, 531 (Mar. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Brazil's Informatics Policy].
7. Law No. 7,232 of Oct. 29, 1984, art. 8(VI), 48 LEx COLETINEA DE LEGISLAI;0 E JURIS-
PRUDPNCIA [LEX] 534, 537 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Informatics Law], translated in KErrH S.
RoSENN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL app. X at 347, 351-52 (1991).
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software industry under this import-limiting policy. Although do-
mestic firms developed technical expertise and were profitable for
several years, the worldwide rapid pace of technical innovation in
the computer industry, combined with diseconomies of scale, im-
peded the effectiveness of this market reserve system.8
By the late 1980s, foreign technology, and not local technol-
ogy, evolved as the industry standard in Brazil. Because the mar-
ket reserve was still in effect at this time," those Brazilians who
wanted foreign technology had to illicitly obtain it, through either
smuggling, unlicensed appropriation, or gray market transactions."0
Both foreign firms and domestic users were discontent. Foreign
firms wanted an open market for their products, and users rebelled
against the high cost and inconvenience of obtaining software."'
Brazilian policymakers wanted a new regime that would bal-
ance technological realities, user demands, and foreign pressures
with the need to create a sophisticated domestic computer indus-
try that could "add value" to foreign technology. Policymakers
were further concerned with cushioning the domestic computer in-
dustry from the impact of a restructuring. The result was an indus-
try that openly used foreign technology, but also included mea-
sures to insure that domestic research, consulting, and
development activities flourished." Brazil first implemented this
strategy in its software industry under the 1987 Software Law.'
3
While the 1984 Informatics Law dealt with computers generally, it
did not regulate software in detail.
14
Part II of this article provides a brief background of the early
development of Brazil's informatics policy and the application of
this policy to imported software. It analyzes how Brazil treated
software prior to the 1987 Software Law, and it provides a brief
study of Brazil's denial of Microsoft's request to license MS-DOS
8. See discussion infra notes 253-56.
9. On February 27, 1991, Brazil instituted an industrial competitiveness program
designed to modernize Brazil's industries through investment in the industrial sector. As
part of this program, Brazil's market reserve for software ended. Brazilian President Pro-
poses Program to Modernize Industries, Investment, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 363 (Mar. 6,
1991) [hereinafter Brazilian President Proposes].
10. See infra part IV.A.1.
11. See, e.g., White, supra note 5, at 582 n.29.
12. See infra notes 226, 236.
13. Law No. 7,646 of December 18, 1987, 51 LEx 904 [hereinafter 1987 Software Law],
translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 361.
14. DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: SorrwARE PROTECTION § 3B.04, at 3 (1990).
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and the threat of U.S. trade sanctions against Brazil that followed.
Part III describes the 1987 Software Law and analyzes its applica-
tion over the last five years. Part III also addresses proposed
amendments to the 1987 Software Law now awaiting action before
Brazil's Congress, and it concludes that the fears of software ven-
dors, U.S. government officials, and legal commentators that the
1987 Software Law would be a protectionist, nationalistic, and bu-
reaucratic nightmare for foreign firms were exaggerated. Part III
argues that the law in fact opened the market and protected the
interests of foreign software firms. The 1987 Software Law's copy-
right section'" has functioned smoothly. Furthermore, under the
law's marketing provisions,'6 after some conflict, Brazil has allowed
the marketing of virtually every program offered for posting.
Part IV focuses on the copyright and market reserve provi-
sions of the 1987 Software Law, as well as on the proposed amend-
ment to eliminate the similarity and posting requirements. Part IV
also addresses some of the reasons for the 1987 Software Law's
success and the implications of this success for the liberalization ofBrazil's strict limitations o t imnrntation f hardxarei and its
-------------.------.-. k--
local production requirements. Finally, Part V concludes that as a
result of the 1987 Software Law, Brazil's software industry is more
open and stable, and foreign vendors have a greater opportunity to
market their products.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Brazil's Informatics Policy
Brazil's advocacy of local development and control of the high-
technology industries through market protection historically has
had a broad base of support. Brazil's informatics policy is consis-
tent with legislation enacted since World War II to independently
develop Brazil's strategic industries without the control of more
developed countries. In the 1950s, Brazil granted the state a mo-
nopoly over the exploitation and refining of petroleum. 17 Pe-
trobrfs, the state oil company, developed under the banner "The
15. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, arts. 3-7, 51 LEX at 905-06, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 361-63.
16. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, arts. 20-29, 51 LEX at 908-10, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 365-66.
17. PETER. EVANS, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: THE ALLIANCE OF MULTINATIONAL, STATE,
AND LOCAL CAPITAL IN BRAZIL 91 (1979).
[Vol. 24:2
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Oil is Ours!""8 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Brazil national-
ized foreign utility companies,"9 which expanded rapidly under
state control.20 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brazil's "eco-
nomic miracle" encouraged import substitution by imposing high
tariffs on imports.2 Support for Brazil's control over its economic
destiny continued and even grew as the boom of the "miracle"
years faded into the energy and debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s,
symbols of the continuation of foreign dominance.
2 2
Contrary to what might be expected, liberals were not the only
ones expressing such nationalistic sentiment. Although military
governments and conservative political groups generally supported
foreign investment and foreign enterprise,23 they also favored na-
tional independence and a strong government involvement in stra-
tegic sectors like oil,2 4 utilities,2 5 mining,"6 and aircraft produc-
18. Id. at 90-92. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1964: AN EXPERIMENT
IN DEMOCRACY 97-99 (1967) [hereinafter SKIDMORE, POLITICS IN BRAZIL]. After World War II
and again during the 1950s and early 1960s, there were intense debates over controlling the
key sectors of the Brazilian economy. Economic liberals, mostly on the right of the political
spectrum, favored private solutions, including foreign ownership and investment. The politi-
cal left favored statist solutions, including forming government corporations and nationaliz-
ing foreign investments. In the oil industry, a coalition in favor of state investment and
ultimately the creation of a state monopoly, Petrobris, coalesced after foreign firms failed to
respond to Brazil's request for bids on long-term oil supply contracts and contracts for the
expansion of Brazil's refinery capacity. EVANS, supra note 17, at 90-92.
19. EVANS, supra note 17, at 92-93; SKIDMORE, POLITICS IN BRAZIL, supra note 18, at 132,
244-45. When foreign concession holders were unwilling to make the massive investments
necessary to expand Brazil's generating utilities, the state expropriated the foreign-owned
companies. EVANS, supra note 17, at 90-92.
20. EVANS, supra note 17, at 218.
21. Id. at 67-74.
22. Brazil's energy dependence had economic and political ramifications. Economically,
Brazil's need to import expensive oil fuelled its foreign debt. Politically, problems arose
when the United States attempted to limit Brazil's efforts to create a nuclear power indus-
try. Though the U.S. government was concerned that Brazil would use the civilian program
as a step toward nuclear weapons development, Brazil viewed the program as a step in
achieving energy independence. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE IN
BRAZIL, 1964-85, at 192-97 (1988) [hereinafter SKIDMORE, POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE]. Brazil
still has the world's largest foreign debt. Balancing debt repayment with domestic needs is a
constant source of debate for Brazil. See id. at 274-310 (discussing how these tensions
played out in the years immediately after the return to democratic rule in 1985).
23. Id. at 216-17.
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26. EVANS, supra note 17, at 219, 223, 249-54. The Brazilian company, Companhia do
Vale do Rio Doce, is the largest exporter of iron ore in the world. It has also branched into
exporting other minerals (including aluminum) and natural resources (including wood pulp).
Id. at 250.
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tion.27 During the twenty years of military government after 1964,
policymakers wanted to guarantee themselves some degree of au-
tonomy from overseas suppliers."8 Control over modern weapons
technology often created low-level conflict between Brazil and its
suppliers, especially the United States.2" Brazilian informatics pro-
fessionals trace the initiation of the market reserve of high tech-
nology products to Brazil's purchase of attack boats with comput-
erized guidance systems designed in the 1970s by the British
defense contractor Ferranti. When the British government vetoed
the Brazilian Navy's request to modify the systems and the Navy
was unable to find a Brazilian contractor that could duplicate or
modify the systems, the military began to insist upon protectionist
measures similar to the market reserve system.30
27. Id. at 219, 326. Embraer, a successful exporter, produces light aircraft, including the
Tucano military pilot trainer. Embraer is a source of national pride, especially in military
circles. Because of its strong national identity, the United States chose Embraer as a poten-
tial target for retaliatory action under section 301. For a discussion of the section 301 inves-
tigatory action, see infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
.......o The o---- ------- .sle--s of comput--e pants to Argveiina during the Faik-
lands War made the Brazilian military leaders cautious. Brazil Says "No Thanks" to For-
eign Computers, INT'L MGMT, Sept. 1984, at 83, 87. Products like aircraft, jet engines, so-
phisticated military equipment, and computers could similarly be embargoed by the United
States or by European nations.
29. For example, concerns over nuclear proliferation and Brazil's human rights record
led the United States to interfere in Brazil's nuclear policy. See supra note 22. The U.S.
Congress explicitly linked human rights and military assistance by requiring the State De-
partment to publish human rights evaluations of all countries receiving military assistance.
SKIDMORE, POLInCS OF MILITARY RULE, supra note 22, at 196. An unfavorable report in 1977
caused Brazil to break off military aid agreements. Id. at 197.
30. Interview with Eduardo Carvalho, Managing Director of MultiSoluqbes Informftica,
in Sao Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991); interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., Attorney with
Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Advogados, in S~o Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter Sdo
Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr.]; interview with Georges Fischer, Attor-
ney with Fischer & Forster, in Sklo Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991); see also Jackson Diehl, Com-
peting with the Giants, WASH. POST, July 13, 1983, at Al.
MultiSolu¢bes, which Eduardo Carvalho directs, had modest beginnings as a distributor
of foreign graphics software. In 1990, it had sales of over $2 million and had approximately
one hundred employees. It distributes foreign-made printers, plans and installs networks
and complex systems for businesses, operates a graphics service bureau, and is a value-ad-
ding reseller of Apple computers and peripherals. The company also distributes software
including products by Microsoft, Aldus, Bitstream, HDC, Micrografix, and Haute Tension.
Before founding Multisolui6es, Carvalho worked as a programmer for several major firms
and also spent a year working in the United States with Microsoft, customizing products for
export to Brazil.
Fernandes and Fischer are leading software attorneys in Brazil. Fernando Jos6 Fernan-
des is a Director of the Brazilian Association of Informatics Law (Associacao Brasileiro de
Direito de Informatica, ABDI). Before starting his own practice, Fernandes was an attorney
with firms including Itautec, DuPont of Brazil, and VASP, then Brazil's largest domestic
airline. He represents a number of U.S. and Brazilian informatics companies, including
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Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Brazilian government denied
foreign manufacturers permission to build minicomputers in Bra-
zil.8 1 In 1977, Brazil officially restricted the manufacture and sale
of both minicomputers and personal computers to national firms.
32
The 1984 Informatics Law and subsequent administrative regula-
tions allocated slices of the market to domestic firms. Although the
regulations allowed these firms to import foreign technology ini-
tially, they also required the firms to develop 100% national hard-
ware and operating systems by 1983.81
The one significant area where the government continues to
allow foreign corporations to manufacture is in the area of main-
frames. IBM, for example, continues to produce and sell main-
frame computers in Brazil, " but most other foreign firms in this
field have either left the country, usually selling-out to national
firms at a loss, or have managed to stay in Brazil by shifting pro-
duction to lower technology goods."5
ADP, the international payroll processing firm. Georges Fischer is President of the ABDI
and has represented numerous international informatics firms, including Arthur Andersen,
AT&T International, Claris, Digital Equipment Corporation, General Electric, Honeywell,
Lotus, Microsoft, NCR, Olivetti, Price Waterhouse, Prime Computer, Sprint, Texas Instru-
ment, and WordPerfect.
31. In 1976, the Brazilian government prohibited IBM from manufacturing a minicom-
puter, which ultimately the company built in Japan and marketed as the Model 36. 0 Lixo
da Reserva de Mercado [The Trash of the Market Reserve], VEJA, June 19, 1991, at 36, 37
(SAo Paulo) [hereinafter The Trash of the Market Reserve]. Later examples of foreign com-
puter ventures that the government discouraged or prohibited include Hewlett-Packard's
plans to produce minicomputers (which were ultimately produced in Mexico) and NCR's
efforts to upgrade the electronic components of its cash registers. Id. In 1983, Brazil forced
Philco, a consumer electronics subsidiary of Ford Motor company, to sell off a semi-conduc-
tor plant at a significant loss. Piorkowski, supra note 4, at 635-36. Similarly, the government
required Racal Milgo, Inc., to sell off its minority interest in Brazil's largest modem manu-
facturer. Id. at 636.
32. See David Vidal, Brazil Declares Computer Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1978, § 3, at 3. The 1984 Informatics Law codified these administrative restrictions. 1984
Informatics Law, supra note 7, art. 12, 48 LEX at 538, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7,
app. X at 353.
The 1984 Informatics Law defines national firms as those whose decision-making and
technological control is held permanently, exclusively, and unconditionally by persons resid-
ing and domiciled in Brazil and at least 70% of the company's capital and voting stock is
held and effectively controlled by persons residing and domiciled in Brazil. Id.
33. Piorkowski, supra note 4, at 621 n.14.
34. In 1989, IBM had sales of over $1 billion in Brazil. How Business Will Cash in on
Liberalization of Brazil Informatics Law, GLOBAL FIN. MARKETS, May 9, 1991, available in
Westlaw, BUS-INTL Database [hereinafter Liberalization of Brazil Informatics Law]. In
1991, its sales totalled $1.5 billion. Brazil-Informatics Market Profile, 1992 National
Trade Data Bank: Market Reports, Aug. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library,
Brazil File.
35. Piorkowski, supra note 4, at 635-36; The Trash of the Market Reserve, supra note
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:2
The Brazilian government built a substantial apparatus to reg-
ulate informatics. In 1979, the government created 6 the Special
Informatics Secretariat (SEI).s7 Between 1979 and 1984, the SEI
had policy-making authority, and through the 1980s, it performed
the day-to-day supervision of informatics, earning a reputation as
an extremely aggressive advocate of developing .national technol-
ogy. 8 After the enactment of the 1984 Informatics Law, 9 the Na-
tional Informatics and Automation Council (CONIN) "° became the
key policy-making body for informatics, and thus, it directs the ac-
tivities of the SEI.L The National Institute for Industrial Property
(INPI)" approves all technology transfer agreements in the in-
formatics area. The Foreign Commerce Board of the Bank of Bra-
zil (CACEX),43 also peripherally involved in informatics, autho-
rizes the release of foreign exchange payments.
31, at 37.
36. Decree No. 84,067 of Oct. 8, 1979, 43 LEx 780 (1979). The SEI succeeded the Com-
mission for the Coordination of Electronic Processing activities (CAPRE). Id.; see Leigh E.
Thomas, Comment, Brazil's Informatics Bargaining Chip: Playing the Third-World Card,
19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 413, 420 (1987-88). Though SEI and CAPRE have similar
objectives, CAPRE is more limited in its administrative authority. Id. at 420 n.37.
37. The Brazilian title is Secretaria Especial de Informtica. The SEI is Brazil's
"watchdog agency," Thomas, supra note 36, at 420, and was headed by Army and Navy
engineers to administer the military's informatics policy. Piorkowski, supra note 4, at 621-
22.
38. Criticism of the SEI is almost universal among informatics professionals. See, e.g.,
The Trash of the Market Reserve, supra note 31, at 40 (comparing the SEI to the Gestapo);
Brazil Approves Joint Venture Allowing IBM to Import First Foreign Personal Computers,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Feb. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNA-ITD File
(SEI "largely reflected nationalistic concerns and supported government measures to protect
local companies").
In late 1990, the Brazilian government reduced the stature of the SEI from a secretariat
to a department, and it is now known as DEPIN, Department of Informatics and Automa-
tion Policy. Interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., Attorney with Fernando Jos6 Fer-
nandes, Advogados, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 8, 1992) [hereinafter Boston interview with Fer-
nando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr.]; Georges Charles Fischer, Derradeiro Tributo ao Passado [Final
Tribute to the Past], 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, Oct. 16, 1990; Brazil-Computer Software
Market, 1992 National Trade Data Bank: Market Reports, Mar. 31, 1992, available in
LEXIS, NSAMER Library, Brazil File.
39. 1984 Informatics Law, supra note 7, art. 8(VI), 48 LEx at 537, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X at 351-52.
40. The Brazilian title is Conselho Nacional de Informdtica e Automaqao.
41. 1984 Informatics Law, supra note 7, arts. 1, 6-8, 48 LEx at 534, 536-37, translated
in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X at 347, 349-52.
42. The Brazilian title is Instituto Nacional de Propriedade Industrial. For a helpful
introduction to the function and purpose of INPI and the Carteira de Com6rcio Exterior
(CACEX), see Keith S. Rosenn, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Critical
Analysis, 15 LAW. AM. 307 (1983).
43. The Brazilian title is Carteira de Com&rcio Exterior.
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The 1984 Informatics Law codified Brazil's informatics pol-
icy." The law established CONIN as the policy-making authority
in informatics, and required it to report directly to the President
of the Republic. 5 CONIN's functions also include directing the
SEI," coordinating the efforts of other government agencies in-
volved in informatics,'" and creating national informatics plans.'
CONIN has wielded enormous power since its inception because
the Informatics Law gave the organization great discretion in con-
trolling market entry, regulating the entry of foreign firms,' 9 and
disbursing tax concessions and research and development funds.50
The 1984 Informatics Law created an eight year market re-
serve for national firms."' The law permitted only firms with capi-
tal, technology, and ownership under Brazilian control to produce
informatics goods.2 The law additionally limited hardware produc-
tion to a few firms in each market segment. 58 Foreign firms could
market products in Brazil, but only with CONIN's approval and
only where no similar national product existed; even then, the for-
eign firms had to undertake research and development activity in
Brazil, and they had to export some of their production.
5 4
44. 1984 Informatics Law, supra note 7, 48 LEX at 534, translated in ROSENN, supra
note 7, app. X at 347.
45. Id. arts. 5-7, 48 LEX at 536-37, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X at 349-
51.
46. Id. art. 8, 48 LEx at 537, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X at 351-52.
47. Id. art. 7(III-VI), 48 LEx at 536-37, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X at
350.
48. Id. art. 7(11), 48 LEx at 536, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X at 350.
49. Id. arts. 12, 22, 48 LEx at 538, 540-41, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X
at 353, 356.
50. Id. arts. 7(VI, XVI), 13-17, 21, 31-32, 35, 48 Lax at 536-37, 539-40, 542-43, trans-
lated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X at 350-51, 353-55, 358-59.
51. Id. arts. 12, 22, 48 LEx at 538, 540-41, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. X
at 353, 356.
52. Id.
53. In some areas, like in the manufacturing of PCs, the plans were revised to allow
other entrants.
54. 1984 Informatics Law, supra note 7, art. 22(I), 48 LEx at 540, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. X at 356. A number of firms, most notably IBM, have done this success-
fully. See supra note 34. Brazilian informatics industry executives give IBM high praise for
its business savvy and its ability to "operate like a national company." Interview with
Eduardo Carvalho, supra note 30; interview with Antonio Laps Silveira, Managing Director
of MultiSolucbes Informitica, in SAo Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991). For information about
Carvalho and MultiSolu 6es, see supra note 30. Before founding MultiSoluv6es, Lapa devel-
oped mainframe programs for VASP, Brazil's largest domestic airline, and PC programs for
Compucenter, a large software distributor. For a brief profile of Compucenter, see infra note
227.
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B. Regulation and Marketing of Software Before the 1987
Software Law
Until the passage of the 1987 Software Law, Brazil did not
explicitly provide copyright protection to software.55 Brazil treated
licensing contracts as technology transfer agreements under its In-
dustrial Property Code." Many of the terms required under the
Code were unpalatable to foreign software firms. For example, the
SEI and the INPI had to review the contracts, the initial registra-
tion period was only for two years, and the registration renewal
process was unclear. Additionally, payments to the licensor were
limited to 5% of the net price of each unit sold. Licensing agree-
ments could not limit the right of Brazilian firms to improve or
modify the software, nor could they prohibit Brazilian firms from
reselling the product in Brazil or overseas."' Further, in many cases
the producing firm had to deposit the source code 5s with the
licensee.59
Because of the Code's harshness, purchasers and producers en-
gaged in a number of practices to circumvent the law. For example,
Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign firms received software directly
from their parent companies, and therefore could avoid application
of the Code because such a transfer was not a purchase.60 Further,
because the government did not require authorization for copy-
right payments for books distributed in Brazil, many companies
received software under the guise of purchasing manuals."' Other
firms smuggled overseas software into the country or purchased
unauthorized copies.62
Eventually, the pressure to create a more viable regime for
protecting the rights of software authors increased. Specifically,
55. See Law No. 5,772 of Dec. 21, 1971, 35 Lax 1740 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Industrial
Property Code].
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 29, 35 LEx at 1745; see also Schwimmer, Brave New World, supra note 3, at
27.
58. The source code contains the program as written in any of several programming
languages. The source code is then converted into machine langauge, also known as object
code, which the computer can understand. The source code reveals more of the logic of the
programmer than does the object code. Thus, authors are reluctant to reveal the source code
because another programmer could easily duplicate the function of the software without
actually copying it line by line. White, supra note 5, at 583.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 582 n.29.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., id. at 588-89.
[Vol. 24:2
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the rigors of the technology transfer regime and the inconvenience
of circumventing the requirements made foreign firms reluctant to
market software in Brazil. Even firms that circumvented these re-
quirements did not want to place long-term reliance on measures
like smuggling and characterizing the purchase as one for manuals
rather than software. Both foreign software suppliers and Brazilian
software users argued for fewer restrictions on the importation of
software. Additionally, concerns in the United States over inade-
quate intellectual property protection for software prompted the
U.S. Trade Representative to initiate a section 301'
s investigatory
action against Brazil in September 1985.8"
On a more general, worldwide level, there was much confusion
in the mid-1980s over which regime was the most appropriate in-
tellectual property protection for software-patent, copyright, or
industrial property laws. While the consensus favored copyright
protection, Brazil was one of a number of countries in the early
1980s to have reservations about making software subject to copy-
right."' Aside from the proposals of developing countries for a
"new information order" ' and aside from the malign neglect of
countries where software piracy was an important industry, devel-
oped countries, such as Japan, France, and Canada, seriously con-
sidered proposals that would limit the protection of software to
much shorter periods than for other copyrighted materials." De-
veloped countries also considered proposals that required the dis-
63. 1974 Trade Act § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
64. White, supra note 5, at 584-86. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act allows the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and attempt to resolve difficulties with
protective trade practices of other countries. 1974 Trade Act § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
Between 1985 and 1989 the USTR investigated Brazil's informatics policy. For a thorough
description of the section 301 investigation from its inception through the passage of the
1987 Software Law, see White, supra note 5, at 584-86; see also M. Jean Anderson et al.,
Intellectual Property Protection in the Americas: The Barriers Are Being Removed, J.
PROPRIETARY RTS., Apr. 1992, at 2, 7.
Section 301 proceedings give U.S. businesses and interest groups with complaints about
protectionist regulations a sympathetic forum for aggressively pursuing their complaints.
These actions are effective because most trading nations fear U.S. trade sanctions.
65. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Krauthaus, Classification of Computer
Software for Legal Protection: International Perspectives, 21 INT'L LAW. 733, 737-38 (1987);
see also Jean-Frangois Bellis & Peter L'Ecluse, The Meaning of Competition Law for Infor-
mation Technology in Europe, in THE LAW OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992: A
COMPARISON WITH THE USA 69 (Alfred P. Meijboom & Corien Prins eds., 1991).
66. Joel R. Reidenberg, Note, U.S. Software Protection: Problems of Trade Secret Es-
toppel Under International and Brazilian Technology Transfer Regimes, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 679 (1985).
67. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 65, at 751-53.
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closure of an outline of how the program functioned and that com-
pelled the licensing of the software." Although these countries
ultimately rejected most of these provisions,6' they illustrate some
of the inherent problems associated with trying to protect both au-
thors and users of software.
The 1984 Informatics Law indicated that software and its doc-
umentation would be the subject of a separate law. 0 Shortly after
the passage of the 1984 Informatics Law, the lame duck military
government proposed a software law with a ten year protection pe-
riod and mandatory disclosure of the source code.7 The proposal,
however, languished in the Brazilian Congress.7
In May 1986, the Supreme Court of Sao Paulo, the leading
state in the Brazilian economy, held that Brazilian copyright law
applied to software.7" Later that year, CONIN issued an adminis-
trative opinion protecting the rights of software authors under
copyright law.
7 4
In December 1986, Brazilian President Jos6 Sarney presented
Congress with a draft software law extending copyright protection
to software, but restricting the marketing of foreign software.7 5
The draft law required all software to be sold through Brazilian
distributors and limited the sale of foreign software to situations
where there was no Brazilian equivalent. The proposal of the bill
and its progress through Congress intertwined with: 1) the govern-
ment's review of several Brazilian personal computer (PC) manu-
facturers' requests to license MS-DOS, Microsoft's personal com-
puter operating system; and 2) pressure from the U.S. Trade
68. Id.
69. Id. The most notable exception is France's twenty-five year limit on copyright pro-
tection for software. Id. The French limit is found in Law No. 85-660 of July 3, 1985, La
Semaine Juridique (Juris-Classeur Priodique) [J.C.P.] I1, No. 57,400 (1985) [hereinafter
French Copyright Law].
70. 1984 Informatics Law, supra note 7, art. 43, 48 LEx at 543, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. X at 360.
71. Piorkowski, supra note 4, at 629 n.69; see also Michael W. Miller, U.S. Software
Firms Try to Protect Big American Share of World Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1985, at
34 [hereinafter U.S. Software Firms].
72. Piorkowski, supra note 4, at 629 n.69; U.S. Software Firms, supra note 71, at 34.
73. Judgment of May 27, 1986, TJSP, No. 68-945-1 (Braz.). Although the court found
that copyright law applied to software, it distinguished the particular facts of the case at
hand, deciding that ROM was hardware. See White, supra note 5, at 585 n.41; see also
Michael S. Keplinger, International Protection for Computer Programs, 4 SorrwAaE L.J.
15, 21-23 (1990).
74. See White, supra note 5, at 586 n.43.
75. Draft Law No. 8,551 of Dec. 9, 1986 (on file with author).
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Representative via the section 301 trade investigation.
President Sarney presented Congress with the draft software
law shortly before a review deadline on the section 301 complaint
of the U.S. Trade Representative. The United States postponed
retaliatory action for six months based on the copyright protection
offered by the bill.7 6 One week before the six month deadline, the
Chamber of Deputies approved the bill and forwarded it to the
Senate." Consequently, action on the relevant part of the section
301 complaint was again put on hold.
7 8
C. The Microsoft MS-DOS Case and Passage of the 1987
Software Law
On September 22, 1987, the SEI, in a decision that jarred for-
eign software vendors, refused MS-DOS's licensing request, basing
its decision on the rule that limits the licensing of foreign products
to those situations where no similar Brazilian products exist.
79
While the SEI's refusal to license MS-DOS is not representative of
its later application of the rule, the refusal reveals the conflicts in
the area of informatics in Brazil. The backlash from the refusal
also set the trend for pragmatic approvals in the few contested
cases that subsequently arose.
Although the Brazilian companies manufacturing and selling
personal computers were supposed to create operating systems for
their machines,80 financial and commercial pressures hindered the
development of Brazilian operating systems and pushed the na-
tional manufacturers to adapt their computers to MS-DOS.81 From
the start, the government's expectations for development were out
of proportion to the resources it committed to the effort. The gov-
ernment did not provide enough subsidies for the development ef-
forts.8 2 Although some firms received financial assistance, the gov-
76. Brazil's Informatics Policy, supra note 6, at 531.
77. Anne Charters & Stewart Fleming, Brazil Legislature Approves Software Protec-
tion Bill, FIN. TIMES (London), June 26, 1987, at 5.
78. Id.
79. BENDER, supra note 14, § 3B.04, at 4.
80. For example, Scopus, one of the leading Brazilian computer manufacturers, aban-
doned its own personal computer operating system after investing several years of work and
$30 million. The Trash of the Market Reserve, supra note 31, at 40. Scopus replaced its
operating system with a U.S. system which it licensed for $250,000. Id.
81. Id.
82. Interview with Felipe Gomez Perez, President of Monydata Teleinformfitica Ltd. (a
hardware manufacturer), in SAo Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991). Monydata controls approximately
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ernment intended the profits generated from the reserved market
to be the main engine of the industry's growth. Firms desire to
maximize their profits and therefore have no incentive to invest in
the development of new software when they can easily copy ex-
isting operating software."' MS-DOS's emergence as the worldwide
standard for PC software and the Brazilian government's decision
to open its PC market to all national firms, rather than limiting
entry to two or three firms as originally intended, further intensi-
fied the pressure to copy. 4
Because MS-DOS is the worldwide standard for personal com-
puters, there is much software already written for it. To be com-
mercially viable, Brazilian PC operating systems have to be MS-
DOS compatible. The division of the market among more firms
lessened the likelihood of any manufacturer operating on a large
enough scale to defray the programming costs of the operating sys-
tem. Developing new operating systems requires writing, testing,
and debugging. Because MS-DOS was already operational, Brazil-
ian manufacturers could achieve enormous financial and marketing
jumps on their competitors by copying IVIS-DOS.
In 1986, Microsoft discovered that at least five Brazilian com-
puter manufacturers were using MS-DOS or clones as their operat-
ing system without Microsoft's permission." Microsoft approached
these firms and convinced them to seek the SEI's permission to
license MS-DOS from Microsoft.' Three Brazilian firms opposed
the licensing request, claiming they had developed similar operat-
ing systems.8 7 The most important of these systems, SISNE, was
developed by Scopus Technologia, one of Brazil's most technologi-
cally sophisticated and politically favored high-technology compa-
nies.8 SISNE was operational and compatible with MS-DOS.
20% of the PC market in Brazil. It produces high-end PCs, including laptops, using Intel's
advanced 486 processor. It also has a technology transfer agreement with NCR. Liberaliza-
tion of Brazil Informatics Law, supra note 34.
83. Interview with Felipe Gomez Pbrez, supra note 82.
84. Piorkowski, supra note 4, at 638.
85. White, supra note 5, at 588-89. The five firms were: Itautec Informrtica, Microtec
Sistemas, Polymax Informktica, Sid Informktica, and Labo Eletrbnica. Id. Itautec, Microtec,
and Sid are the industry leaders. Id.
86. Id.
87. The systems were: 1) SISNE, by Scopus Technologia; 2) TK MULTIDOS, by
Microdigital; and 3) SSDDO-SA, by Empresa SSD. Id. at 589. Scopus and Microdigital are
market leaders. Id.
88. The news magazine Veja called Scopus "the apple of the ideologues of the market
reserve's eye" ["a menina dos olhos dos ide6logos da reserva"]. The Trash of the Market
[Vol. 24:2
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The SEI decision was highly political. The SEI reviewed MS-
DOS's licensing request for ten months before rejecting it. That
the software in question was fully operational and that the "win-
ning" side's software would eventually be installed in most of Bra-
zil's PCs raised the stakes. Both Microsoft and Scopus were com-
petent, aggressive, high profile firms. Microsoft had the support of
both the U.S. government and those Brazilians who argued for an
open market, but supporters of the nationalist market reserve ral-
lied around Scopus. The section 301 action and the Brazilian Con-
gress's consideration of the 1987 Software Law were underway si-
multaneously."9 The SEI also knew that its use of the similarity
test would likely set a precedent for future determinations under
the 1987 Software Law.
Shortly before the SEI issued its decision, Microsoft, Scopus
and the manufacturers petitioning for approval of the license
reached a tentative agreement.90 Scopus and the five other manu-
facturers agreed to license MS-DOS from Microsoft, and Microsoft
agreed to drop its infringement claims against them. However,
the SEI's denial of the licensing request effectively destroyed the
agreement.2
In the wake of the SEI decision, the United States reactivated
the section 301 action. " Further, on November 13, 1987, the Rea-
gan administration imposed $105 million in retaliatory tariffs upon
Brazil.94 The Reagan administration delayed its decision as to
which sectors, other than computers, it would impose tariffs. Bra-
zilian congressional factions threatened to invoke counter-sanc-
tions against the United States should it actually impose retalia-
tory tariffs against Brazil. 5  The delay of the Reagan
Reserve, supra note 31, at 40. The magazine also stated that Scopus received $60 million in
long-term, low-interest loans. Id. at 39.
89. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 8, § 2, 51 LEx at 906-07, translated in
RO ENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 363.
90. S~o Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30. Fernandes
was one of Itautec's attorneys at the time.
91. Id. Microsoft had a potential infringement claim against Scopus because some of
the code for SISNE had been copied from MS-DOS.
92. White, supra note 5, at 588-89.
93. Ivo Dawnay, Sarney May Retaliate Over US Trade Bar, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov.
16, 1987, at 2. Brazil is a major exporting country and runs a large trade surplus with the
United States.
94. Id.
95. Brazil to Consider Retaliatory Measures Following U.S. Announcement of Sanc-
tions, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Nov. 19, 1987). The targeted areas included wheat, coal,
fertilizers, and sulphur. Id.
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administration, however, allowed Brazilian exporters time to lobby
their government for a swift, amicable resolution of the dispute.96
Brazil's Senate passed the 1987 software bill.97 As a result of
less rigorous similarity test definitions, foreign software companies
could obtain licenses more easily.98 The House approved the Sen-
ate's version,99 and in mid-December, 1987, President Sarney ap-
proved the law, but selectively vetoed several provisions which the
United States had criticized.100
Microsoft appealed the SEI's license denial to CONIN. 10 1 As
CONIN most likely influenced the SEI's decision, the review pro-
vided a chance for the Brazilian government to change its position.
Faced with U.S. retaliations and a nationalist position somewhat
undermined by the discovery that SISNE had copied portions of
the MS-DOS code, CONIN opted for a compromise solution.1 0 2 It
found that while MS-DOS 3.0 and SISNE were similar, and hence
MS-DOS 3.0 could not be licensed, CONIN found that MS-DOS
3.3 had no Brazilian equivalent.' 0 3 CONIN's decision to license
MS-DOS 3. -. a setal a victory for MLIicrosoft'. Once licensed,
MS-DOS rapidly became the market standard for PC operating
96. Embraer Starts Fight to Avert Trade War with US, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 19,
1987, at 3. Believing that they were the most likely targets for retaliation, several politically
well-connected industries (most notably aircraft) tried to resolve the dispute quickly on
terms palatable to the United States.
97. Brazilian Informatics Council Meetings May Overturn Microsoft License Denial
Decision, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1451 (Nov. 25, 1987). Pursuant to the change, the Sen-
ate would grant licenses to foreign software not functionally equivalent to domestic pro-
grams but otherwise similar. The Senate first imposed, but later vetoed, a 200% tariff on
such foreign software. See Brazil Legislators Vote to Ease Curbs on Software Sales, WALL
ST. J, Dec. 7, 1987, at 20 [hereinafter Brazil Legislators Vote].
98. Brazil Legislators Vote, supra note 97, at 20.
99. Id.
100. Brazil's President Vetoes Part of Bill on Software Sales, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,
1987, at 12 [hereinafter Brazil's President Vetoes]. President Sarney vetoed provisions for a
200% levy on foreign software-which is not functionally equivalent to a domestic program,
but which is otherwise similar. For example, any foreign spreadsheet would be subject to the
tax as soon as a Brazilian spreadsheet was posted. This provision would have added 200% to
the cost of virtually all foreign software in Brazil. The money raised from the levy was to be
applied to a host of informatics developmental and educational activities. For a list of the
vetoed articles, see 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, arts. 16-22, 51 LEx at 908, translated
in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 364-65.
101. White, supra note 5, at 589-90.
102. Id. at 590.
103. Id. The President of Scopus described the decision: "In practice, this means the
end of the market reserve policy in the area of software." Alan Riding, Brazil Accepts One
U.S. Software Product, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1988, at D8 (quoting the President of Scopus).
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software in Brazil.1 0 4
Permitting the licensing of MS-DOS 3.3, along with the pas-
sage of the 1987 Software Law, eased tensions between the United
States and Brazil. Although initially uncertain as to whether the
MS-DOS decision and the software bill went far enough, 0 5 the
United States announced on February 29, 1988, that it would again
postpone sanctions against Brazil.'0
III. THE 1987 SOFTWARE LAW
The 1987 Software Law'07 defines the rights of software au-
thors and provides software copyright protection for foreign firms
if the firm's home country provides reciprocal protection for Bra-
zilian firms.0 8 It also regulates the marketing of software in Brazil.
Brazil's adoption of the 1987 Software Law was due in part to the
U.S. threat of trade sanctions against Brazil and U.S. dissatisfac-
tion with the market reserve.'
A. Copyright
Title II of the 1987 Software Law, entitled "Protection of
Copyright,"" 0 establishes a twenty-five year period for copyright
protection, effective upon the introduction of the software any-
where in the world."' A foreign author whose country grants recip-
104. It is difficult to find Brazilian IBM PC-compatible operating software in Brazil
today. Foreign software dominates the market with an 85% market share, and Brazilian
software is concentrated in application functions like accounting, payroll, taxes, and cash
flow control. BRAZIL-COMPUTER SOFTWARE MARKET, supra note 38.
105. Brazil Tries Compromise to End Dispute with US, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 21,
1988, at 4.
106. Citing Progress in Brazil's Software Policy, Administration Puts Import Sanc-
tions on Hold, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar. 2, 1988), available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD
Database [hereinafter Citing Progress].
107. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, 51 LEX at 904, translated in ROSENN, supra
note 7, app. XI at 361.
108. ROSENN, supra note 7, at 114.
109. Id.
110. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, arts. 3-7, 51 LEx at 905-06, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 361-63.
111. Id. art. 3, 51 LEx at 905, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 361. The
twenty-five year time period is patterned after French law. French Copyright Law, supra
note 69. This is far longer than the commercial life of most software packages, but shorter
than the fifty years granted in other major countries. Michael Vivant, Copyrightability of
Computer Programs in Europe, in THE LAW OP INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992:
A COMPARISON WITH THE USA, supra note 65, at 103, 113-14.
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rocal treatment to Brazilian authors has the same rights as Brazil-
ian authors." 2
Copyright protection under the 1987 Software Law may be ob-
tained without registering a copy of the software or attempting to
market it in Brazil.' If authors wish to register their software,
however, the law provides for registration with the National Au-
thor's Rights Council (CDNA). The registration procedure requires
the author to outline the program."" This outline will remain con-
fidential and does not require the author to reveal the source
code."'
The law grants employers the rights to any software created in
an employment relationship,' limiting the programmers' compen-
sation to their salaries, unless the parties contract otherwise.'
17
However, employees retain the rights to any software developed
independently.'s
The title of the law dealing with copyright concludes with a
list of uses which do not give rise to claims of infringement." 9
T lese uses Include: 1) tinakirig -iecessary backup copies to ensure
112. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 3, § 2, 51 LEX at 905, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 361. This would include most countries, as Brazil is a
member of the Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention. See Universal
Copyright Convention, revised at Paris, July 24, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 1343, 943 U.N.T.S. 178;
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised at Paris July
24, 1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1986).
113. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 3, § 1, 51 LEx at 905, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 361. This contrasts with most patent regimes which re-
quire registration before protection is extended. See, e.g., 1971 Industrial Property Code,
supra note 55, art. 33, 35 LEx at 1746. It is beneficial to foreign software authors to not have
to register their programs at the time of creation to ensure their protection.
114. 1987 Software Liw, supra note 13, art. 4, 51 LEx at 905, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 361-62. Registration procedures, which create legal records of au-
thorship, are common in Latin America. Keplinger, supra note 73, at 21.
115. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 4, 51 LEX at 905, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 361-62. The information can be revealed only by judicial order or at
the request of the copyright holder. Id. art. 4, § 3, 51 LEx at 905, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 361-62. The clearest need for judicial disclosure would occur in a
dispute concerning authorship or plagiarism. A court could limit disclosure to in camera
proceedings, while authors wishing to avoid disclosure could prove authorship in many other
ways (e.g., publication in their home country). Boston interview with Fernando Jos& Fernan-
des, Jr., supra note 38.
116. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, arts. 5-6, 51 LEx at 905-06, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 362.
117. Id. art. 5, § 1, 51 LEx at 905, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 362.
118. Id. art. 5, § 2, 51 LEx at 905-06, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at
362.
119. Id. art. 7, 51 LEx at 906, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 362-63.
BRAZILIAN SOFTWARE LAW
efficient use of the program;2 0 2) partial citation of the program
code for educational purposes, so long as the author and title of
the program are cited; ' 3) development of similar code where le-
gal requirements or technical norms limit alternative forms for ex-
pression;2 2 and 4) use of a program within a larger program, so
long as the new program is for the use of the user alone, and the
essential characteristics of the original program are maintained.
1 22
The first two limitations on copyright-for backups and aca-
demic citation-are commonplace.'2" The latter provisions, how-
ever, are more unusual. The provision allowing for the develop-
ment or use of a similar code where technical or legal
considerations limit alternatives is quite logical on its face. If a
function can only be programmed in a limited number of ways,
then an author could conceivably copyright all possible alterna-
tives and could achieve a complete monopoly on the function. Such
a monopoly is undesirable, and therefore, the law makes exceptions
for such functions. The provision could conceivably affect litigation
in Brazil over the use of basic, common-sense software features,
such as the look and feel of graphic user interfaces. 2 5
The 1987 Software Law contains an authors' rights provision
that may be confusing to an American reader. Brazil ' and many
European countries incorporate the concept of moral rights into
their laws to allow authors to limit changes to their work by users
and to allow authors to withdraw their work from the market
120. Id. art. 7(l), 51 LEx at 906, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 362.
121. Id. art. 7(2), 51 LEx at 906, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 362.
122. Id. art. 7(3), 51 LEx at 906, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 362.
123. Id. art. 7(4), 51 LEx at 906, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 362-63.
124. The United States, Japan, France, and Australia include provisions for making
backups. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 65, at 753.
125. An obvious qualifying point here is that these issues will probably have been re-
solved in the United States before they arise in Brazil, and the stakes of a Brazilian court or
agency coming to a different conclusion from an American court are so high that Brazil will
probably fall in line with the American decision regardless of whether the American decision
makes great legal sense or is consistent with this provision. There has been controversy in
the United States about the quality of the press coverage, pleadings, and rulings in suits for
infringement of graphical user interfaces. See, e.g., Vivant, supra note 111, at 135-36.
126. Law No. 5,988, of Dec. 14, 1973, 37 LEX 1917 (1973). The moral rights provisions
are found in arts. 25-28. 37 LEx at 1921. They include the author's rights to be cited as the
author, to control modifications to the work, and to withdraw the work from circulation. Id.
art. 25, 37 LEx at 1921. An author might want to exercise the withdrawal right, often called
the right of repentance or retraction, when the author has undergone a religious or political
conversion and wishes to withdraw former "heretical" writings from circulation. The law,
however, requires that parties who suffer damage as a result of the withdrawal be indemni-
fied. Id.
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under certain circumstances. 12 Brazil's 1987 Software Law recog-
nizes moral rights of authors, but attempts to make the concept
more compatible with the needs of software users. Users do not
lose their licenses to their software if they modify it or if the au-
thor decides to "repent" and withdraw the work from the
marketplace.
B. Market Reserve Provisions: The Similarity Test and Na-
tional Distributor Requirement
The Software Law's marketing provisions require firms to reg-
ister foreign software or to post it for SEI review before marketing
the programs. 2 " A prohibition on marketing foreign products that
are similar to domestic products protects locally-authored
software. 29 Further, Brazilian distributors can only sell foreign
software to end-users on a non-exclusive basis, and clauses in
agreements between parties that establish exclusivity are null and
void." '
Firms must deposit all software with the SEI for posting''
before they can be commercially marketed.'32 The law conditions
the posting of foreign software on "the non:existence of a similar
computer program, developed in the country by a national com-
pany."' 33 Therefore, if similar national software exists, the SEI de-
127. France's software law presumes that authors assign their rights to control modifi-
cations and to retract when they sell or license their software, unless they specifically retain
these rights. French Copyright Law, supra note 69, arts. 45-46. The law provides that em-
ployers retain the copyrights for software created by their employees, but there is some
doubt as to whether the employer retains all the moral rights to these works as well. Id.;
Vivant, supra note 111, at 117.
In Spain, the authors or translators of a program retain most moral rights to their
works, yielding only the right of adaptation to licensees or assignees. See also Michael S.
Mensik, Software Localization: Hidden Issues That Arise When Software Is Translated
Abroad, COMPUTER LAW., May 1991, at 3-5 (discussing how Spain retains the moral rights of
program authors and translators).
128. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 8, 51 LEx at 906-07, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 363.
129. Id. art. 8, § 2, 51 LEX at 906, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 363.
130. Id. art. 27, 51 LEX at 909, translated in RosENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 365.
131. The posting process is called cadastramento in Portuguese. This Article uses the
word "posted" to distinguish the SEI process from the copyright registration process. The
SEI process is independent of the registration process for copyright.
132. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 8, 51 LEX at 906-07, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 363.
133. Id. art. 8, § 2, 51 LEX at 906, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 363.
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nies foreign software posting.'" The law considers national
software to be similar if it is independently developed and original,
has substantially the same performance characteristics, and per-
forms substantially the same functions. 3 5 The SEI has 120 days
from receiving the software program to accept or reject it for post-
ing,'36 and a firm can appeal a denial of posting to CONIN 3
Though the initial posting is valid for three years, 188 firms can
renew posting for additional three year periods.1 3 ' Foreign ex-
change payments for software are authorized only after the
software has been posted.14
The law makes an exception to the requirement of software
posting when an entity is importing a single copy of a computer
program that is specifically designated for the use of the importing
party." This exception is of great value to firms or individuals
who need unusual or specialized programs or rapid access to a pro-
gram. For example, multinational firms that want their Brazilian
subsidiaries to adopt existing customized software can now do so
without going through the posting process. 4 2
The law contains a number of provisions outlining the rights
of users. For example, firms must license software for a fixed price,
not to exceed the worldwide average price for the product.4 3 The
134. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 10(a), (d), 51 LEX at 907, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 363-64.
135. Id.
136. Id. art. 11, 51 LEx at 907, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 364.
137. Id. art. 9, 51 LEx at 907, translated in RoSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 363.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. art. 8, § 3, 51 LEx at 906-07, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at
363. This provision is an obvious incentive for foreign authors who want to be paid in hard
currency to post their software. It also aids Brazil's foreign exchange regulators in determin-
ing whether a requested payment is for a legitimate program.
141. Id. art. 30, 51 LEx at 910, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 366.
142. Interview with Mario Fleck, Managing Partner with Andersen Consulting, in Sao
Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991). Andersen Consulting is probably the world's largest computer sys-
tems and management consulting organization. It is part of Arthur Andersen & Co. SC,
which also owns the eponymous international public accounting firm. Rhys David, Profile:
Andersen Consulting; Forward Thinking, FIN. TIMEs (London), Oct. 21, 1992, § IV at III.
143. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 29, 51 LEx at 909-10, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 366. This provision and the limitation on user profits and produc-
tion contracts are aimed as much at restricting remittance fraud as they are at granting
"user rights." There was concern that free pricing and wide liberty in drafting contract pro-
visions would allow payment for software to be used as a front for making unrelated remit-
tances. Sio Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30; interview
with Georges Fischer, supra note 30. Brazil's concerns about tax evasion by multinational
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law also prohibits contracts based on the user's profitability or pro-
duction.144 Software distributors are required to offer technical
support and error correction for as long as the posting is valid.
145
The law prohibits software licensees from indemnifying either the
author or the distributor of the software for damages arising from
"imperfections, defects or violation of copyright."'
40
The law in most circumstances prohibits foreign firms from di-
rectly distributing their software. Except where the software is
designed for use on imported computers (normally mainframes),
1 4 7
Brazilian entities must handle the distribution.
48 The law does not
allow exclusive distributorships or agreements limiting software
marketing.' 9
The law requires government agencies to purchase domestic
software over foreign software when the quality of the software is
otherwise equal. 15 0 However, the law does not provide guidelines
for determining when software is of equal quality.
The .. provides for severe penalties: six ... hl to two years
imprisonment plus a fine for copyright violators;'"" and one to four
years imprisonment and a fine for importers of unposted foreign
software. ' The law empowers judges to authorize searches and to
issue injunctions for halting the distribution of illegal software,
and it provides for both criminal and civil actions against
violators.' 2
firms are not new. Rosenn, supra note 42, at 360.
144. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 29, 51 LEx at 909-10, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. X1 at 366.
145. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 27, para. (c), 51 LEX at 909, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 365.
146. Id.
147. Id. art. 12, 51 LEx at 907, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 364.
148. Id. art. 28, 51 LEx at 909, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 365-66.
149. Id. art. 27, paras. (a), (b), 51 LEX at 909, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app.
XI at 365.
150. Id. art. 32, § 2, 51 LEx at 910, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 366-
67.
151. Id. art. 35, 51 Lax at 911, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 367.
152. Id. art. 37, 51 Lax at 911, translated in ROSENN. supra note 7, app. XI at 367.
153. Id. arts. 38-39, 51 LEx at 911, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 367-
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IV. ANALYSIS: EVALUATING THE 1987 SOFTWARE LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION
A. Copyright
The 1987 Software Law took effect immediately, ' improving
the ability of copyright holders to protect their software. Illegal
copying by distributors and corporations has diminished signifi-
cantly since the 1987 Software Law was enacted.1 55 But the new
law is only partly responsible. Changes in foreign exchange remit-
tance rules and the development of a wider, more sophisticated,
lower-priced software market have also contributed to the
decrease.' 6
1. The Software Market Before the 1987 Software Law
Prior to passage of 1987 Software Law, software distributors
and large corporate users extensively pirated software. 5 7 Even
multinational corporations pirated software in Brazil. 158 Such con-
duct reflects the fact that firms and distributors could not easily
obtain and legally pay for foreign software.' 5 9 Many foreign
software vendors were reluctant to either participate in the ex-
isting "technology transfer for royalty payments" regime or make
the substantial investments of time and effort necessary to win
special approval from the SEI for licensing agreements.' To cir-
154. Id. art. 42, 51 LEx at 912, translated in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 367-68.
155. See infra part IV.A.2-3.
156. See infra part IV.A.3-4.
157. A report by the U.S. Consulate in Sao Paulo estimates that 60% of the software
used in 1992 was pirated and that before passage of the 1987 Software Law, 90% of the
software in use in Brazil was pirated. Brazil-Computer Software Market, supra note 38;
see also, Brazil's Informatics Policy, supra note 6, at 533 (Software Publishers Association
finds "substantial" piracy).
Piracy is also widespread in Europe and North America. Alan Cane, Pirates Hold
Software to Ransom, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 13, 1990 at 8. A British survey estimates
that 55% of senior managers copy software illegally. Id. The article estimates losses from
piracy at $439 million in the UK, $1.4 billion in Germany, $792 million in Spain, $768 mil-
lion in Italy, and $635 million in France. Id. All estimates of the extent and value of piracy
are "soft" numbers, more useful as an indication of the relative magnitude of the problem
than as precise estimates of software use or revenue losses.
158. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. Being paid an annual royalty for
software, having to deposit the source code, and being scrutinized by both the SEI and
INPI, rather than being paid cash and going through the generally painless SEI posting
procedure, was unattractive to software vendors.
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cumvent the restrictions, Brazilian purchasers bought software
overseas and brought it into Brazil without SEI approval; received
software under the guise of purchasing manuals, which could be
imported and paid for with foreign exchange without special ap-
proval; or just copied it. 1 All these alternatives were either illegal
or existed in a gray area under the law, and the first two, which
software vendors obviously preferred, involved fairly elaborate ma-
neuvering of financial paperwork.
Concomitant with the practical difficulties of purchasing and
paying for legal software was a business climate that accepted, or
at least failed to discourage, copying. Though many business peo-
ple and attorneys condemned piracy in principle,"' they gave two
explanations for this attitude. First, the stress of surviving in the
Brazilian economy led to a "wide-open" business climate where
ethical corners must be cut to stay competitive with others who
have already cut corners. Second, software is essential to building
an economy, and since vendors were reaping extensive profits in
the United States, Japan, and Europe, Brazilians felt that it was
al,.n+t o.,.Irvs r f 1noft.,
Regardless of motivation, the unlikelihood of punishment and
the understanding that copying was so widespread that firms not
engaging in it would be at a competitive disadvantage acted as fur-
ther incentives to engage in unauthorized copying.
2. Influence of the Law's Copyright Section
The 1987 Software Law's copyright section provided a legal
framework for combatting piracy. Brazil has brought a large num-
ber of actions and has successfully resolved many of them.
s Al-
though many cases settled quietly, a series of raids in April 1989,
on behalf of Ashton-Tate,"' garnered substantial publicity. Ash-
ton-Tate decided to make an example of a large industrial firm
that was illegally copying its software, so that other corporate users
161. See, e.g., White, supra note 5, at 582 n.29.
162. Sao Paulo interview with Eduardo'Carvalho, supra note 30; Sao Paulo interview
with Fernando Jose Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30; interview with Georges Fischer, supra
note 30.
163. No decisions have been reported in these cases because the cases are settled before
or during trial. Sao Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30; inter-
view with Georges Fischer, supra note 30.
164. Ashton-Tate was a large American software firm, best known for its database
software. It has since been purchased by another American software firm, Borland.
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would purchase rather than copy their software.'5 Ashton-Tate's
Brazilian attorneys created a hotline for leads on piracy. ' To
avoid nationalistic backlash, Ashton-Tate targeted Black and
Decker, a multinational firm.'
67
The raid received much publicity ' and resulted in a 200% to
300% increase in sales of packaged software.6 9 Subsequent raids
organized by the firm and sponsored by Ashton-Tate and the Bra-
zilian Software Companies Association (ABES) 170 resulted in no-
ticeable but less dramatic upswings in sales.17 1
3. Resolution of Foreign Exchange Remittance Problems
Although the 1987 Software Law immediately affected copy-
right protection, software importation, and software pricing, Cen-
tral Bank restrictions on foreign exchange remittance created a sig-
nificant roadblock to transactions in the software market during
the first year and a half after the 1987 Software Law's passage.
Simply put, foreign software firms could safely market their prod-
uct but they risked delays in payment because the Central Bank
refused to authorize payment in foreign currency.17 1
165. Interview with Manoel J. Pereira dos Santos, Attorney with Santos Remor e
Santana, in Sao Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991). Santos is a leading software attorney. He repre-
sented Ashton-Tate and has other Brazilian and foreign informatics clients, including Aldus
and ABES, the Brazilian Software Industry Association. He was the first president of ABDI,
the Brazilian Informatics Law Association.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., ABES inicia a fase prltica de sua ofensiva contra piratas de software
[ABES starts the practical phase of its software anti-piracy offensive], FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO, Apr. 26, 1989, at G3.
169. U.S. Software Companies Hope Raids in Brazil Will Help Increase Legal Sales of
Programs, 7 Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA) 697 (May 16, 1990). Reinaldo Caccbos, director of
Ashton-Tate's Brazilian distributor, estimated the value of pirated software in the Brazilian
market at $120 million in 1989, versus $80 million actually purchased. Id.; see also Access to
Brazil's Software Market Is Said to Be Improved Under New Law, 38 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 391, 392-93 (Aug. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Access to Brazil's Software
Market] (describing the effect of the raids and estimating the value of piracy at $167 million
in 1988). The same article describes how Autodesk, an American engineering software com-
pany, sold seven thousand copies of a Portuguese language manual for its AutoCad software
before the software was even marketed in Brazil (suggesting massive piracy). Access to Bra-
zil's Software Market, at 392.
170. The Brazilian title is Associaqao Brasileira de Empresas de Software.
171. Interview with Manoel J. Pereira dos Santos, supra note 165.
172. Brazil does not have an open currency exchange market. See Michael Schwimmer,
New Legislation on Import Duties and Payment for Foreign Software in Brazil, 4 INT'L
COMPUTER L. ADVISER 5, 6 (1989) [hereinafter Schwimmer, New Legislation]. In an effort to
minimize the outflow of hard currency, requests for remittance of foreign exchange are re-
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The 1987 Software Law authorizes remittance of foreign ex-
change to overseas software vendors as long as the price of the
software does not exceed the average world price for the product
and the purchaser can produce an official receipt issued by the
owner of the corresponding rights for the software.17 3 However,
CACEX, which must authorize all official rate foreign exchange re-
mittances, decided that this measure was insufficient to forestall
foreign exchange fraud and generally refused to approve foreign
exchange remittances from Brazilian software distributors to over-
seas software vendors. During this period there was a large gap
ranging from 60% to 100% between the official Brazilian exchange
rate and that of other organizations,"' creating pressure on
CACEX to take a hard-nosed attitude toward remittances which
might be a front for laundering funds at the advantageous official
exchange rate.17
Because CACEX refused to approve remittances, distributors
were unable to pay for their software through officially sanctioned
channels. CACEX had been trying to make foreign software more
costly, and it reinstated a vemo provision. Ti e aizreutive Uf send-
ing money overseas through parallel black market channels was ex-
pensive because of the substantial spread between the official Bra-
zilian exchange rate and the parallel foreign exchange rate.
Distributors who faced being cut off by their suppliers for lack of
payment were left with unappealing alternatives: remit through
parallel market channels at high market exchange rates; plead with
vendors to wait while they lobbied CACEX to either approve re-
mittances on a case-by-case basis or establish an approval system
for software remittances; or meet software demand by illegally cop-
ying software, thus eliminating the need for software shipments
from abroad." ' Most distributors pursued a combination of strate-
gies. It is difficult to estimate the scale of illegal copying, but it is
generally felt that it was not uncommon, given the convergence of
viewed individually by the Central Bank. Id. If they are approved, exchanges are made at
the official rate. Id. Otherwise, transactions must take place at the higher tourist rate or at
the still higher parallel market rate. The parallel market is a black market that operates on
a large scale. Id. It is tolerated because it provides an important safety valve as an alternate
source of foreign exchange for both meeting business needs and controlling inflation.
173. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 29, 51 LEx at 909-10, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 366.
174. Schwimmer, New Legislation, supra note 172, at 6.
175. See id.
176. Sio Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30; interview
with Antonio Lapa Silveira, supra note 54.
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necessity, market confusion, and financial secrecy. 17 7 Until a stable
system for remittances could be adopted, any attempt to introduce
more control over copying software was practically impossible.
In September 1989, the Central Bank allowed remittances for
the sale of software based on the tourist rate of exchange, 7 thus
chartering a way out of this cycle. The Central Bank created the
tourist rate of exchange 179 in December 1988 as a currency ex-
change for tourism and other non-essential services. 180 It is deter-
mined on a market supply and demand basis rather than fixed on a
daily basis by the Central Bank.'8 ' The tourist rate closely tracks
the parallel or "black market" exchange rate, which is usually 60%
to 100% higher than the official rate.'8 '
The benefits of this regime vastly outweigh its drawbacks. It
created a simple, relatively stable, above-board mechanism for re-
mittances. Foreign software vendors received payments in a regu-
lar manner, and were better able to monitor the activities of their
distributors.'8 3 The principal drawback of the new system was its
use of the higher tourist rate, which effectively made foreign
software more expensive in Brazilian currency. However, this
drawback was mitigated in several ways. First, because the official
rate was foreclosed to all market participants, no firm, or group of
firms, gained a relative advantage. Second, the Brazilian govern-
177. Sao Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30; interview
with Antonio Lapa Silveira, supra note 54; interview with Eduardo Carvalho, supra note 30;
interview with Zeke Wimert, President of Oracle Brazil, in Sao Paulo, Braz. (Aug. 1991).
One story depicts an American software sales representative marvelling at the duplication
capacity of his Brazilian distributor and then being rebuffed when asked if the quantity of
software being duplicated bore any resemblance to the copies being paid for. This volume
copying died out after mechanisms for legal payment allowed software vendors to police
sales and reimbursement more closely. Sio Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes,
Jr., supra note 30; interview with Antonio Lapa Silveira, supra note 54; interview with
Eduardo Carvalho, supra note 30; interview with Zeke Wimert, supra.
Oracle Brazil is a leading national developer of software that extracts information from
mainframe, minicomputer, and personal computer databases. Oracle's President, Zeke
Wimert, is a director of the American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil-Sao Paulo and was
formerly Managing Director of Motorola's Brazilian affiliate.
178. See Schwimmer, New Legislation, supra note 172, at 5.





183. It was difficult for software vendors to monitor the prevailing chaotic situation
because often software payments were disguised as payments for manuals, services, or know-
how transfers, each at different rates of exchange. It is much easier to audit a system where
all transactions are booked as software sales at a common exchange rate. See id.
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ment tried to minimize the spread in values between the official
and parallel (black) market rates. While the spread in August 1990
was under 20%, the spread in August 1991 was about 10%. 111 Even
if there were a way around paying at the tourist rate, it probably
would not have been cost effective. After the remittance rules al-
lowed for payment at the tourist rate, piracy by distributors and
corporate users dropped dramatically. 5
4. Increasing Sophistication of the Brazilian Software Market
Since the passage of the 1987 Software Law and the resolution
of the foreign exchange remittance problems, the software market
in Brazil has expanded and become more competitive. Virtually all
the leading PC software programs are sold in Brazil. Pricing is
highly competitive,180 and while market penetration does not com-
pare with that in major industrialized countries, 87 it is expanding
rapidly.' Not every secretary in Brazil has a computer, but com-
184. On August 8, 1990 the spread between the official rate and the parallel rate was
18.88%. On August 8, 1991 it was 11.55%. August Rate Tables, Veja, Aug. 1991 (Sao
Paulo). The spread between the official rate and the tourist rate tends to be slightly less.
185. Sao Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30; interview
with Antonio Lapa Silveira, supra note 54; interview with Eduardo Carvalho, supra note 30;
interview with Zeke Wimert, supra note 177.
186. A review of numerous advertisements in the Informdtica sections of the major Sao
Paulo newspapers shows that all the major word processing, spreadsheet, database, graphics,
and presentation programs are available at prices that approach actual U.S. retail prices.
187. See The Trash of the Market Reserve, supra note 31, at 37. The Veja article
surveyed computer use in five fields in Brazil and four developed countries. The fields were:
percentage of automobile production movements automated; percentage of small and me-
dium businesses using computers for production; percentage of large businesses using com-
puters for production; percentage of hospitals using computers in patient care; and percent-
age of elementary school classrooms with computers in the classroom. The data were
compiled from SUCESU (the Brazilian Telecommunications and Informatics Users Associa-
tion), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the German Federation of Industries,
Club Informatique of France, and MITI (the Japanese Ministry of Industry and
Technology).
Brazil Japan Germany France U.S.
Auto Industry 4% 38% 30% 30% 31%
Small-Medium Businesses 10% 44% 90% 76% 75%
Large Businesses 12% 91% 98% 90% 90%
Hospitals 4% 100% 100% 75% 98%
Elementary School .5% 64% 100% 80% 96%
Id.
188. It is hard to estimate the real size of the Brazilian computer industry because of
the prevalence of software pirating and computer smuggling. Based on the sales of computer
BRAZILIAN SOFTWARE LAW
puters are no longer exclusively the province of engineers and data
processing departments. Lower prices, combined with an ex-
panding class of lay users who want support services, have reduced
the attraction of illegal copying. In a corporate setting it is proba-
bly cheaper in the long run to spend $300 or less for legitimate,
upgradeable, supported copies of Microsoft Word or WordPerfect
than to use illicit copies. When a company illegally copies a pro-
gram, it must test for viruses, copy or produce alternative docu-
mentation, and provide its own support; for similar reasons up-
grading is very expensive.'89
5. Proposed Amendment to the Copyright Provisions of the Law
The proposed revision of the 1987 Software Law now awaiting
approval by Brazil's Congress eliminates those provisions guaran-
teeing authors' moral rights. 9 0 Although it appears that no author
has exercised these rights since the passage of the 1987 Software
Law, eliminating them would provide extra security to users in
that they will not be inconvenienced should an author decide to
remove the software from the market for moral reasons. This
change would likely appeal to American software vendors and their
attorneys who are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the civil law
tradition of protecting authors' moral rights.'
cabinets and monitors-which by far exceeded the sales of computers-Felipe P6rez, Presi-
dent of Monydata, estimated that the volume of smuggled computers equals 160% of the
volume sold legally. Venda ilegal pode somar 130 mil unidades (Illegal Sales Could Sur-
pass 130,000 Units), FOLHA DE SKO PAULO, June 16, 1991, § 1 at 6.
However, there is agreement that the market has grown rapidly. ABICOMP, the Brazil-
ian computer hardware manufacturers association (Associado Brasileira das Industrias de
Computadores e Periftricos), estimates that legal sales in the hardware market grew from
$1.8 billion in 1984, to $3.4 billion in 1986, to $5.1 billion in 1988, and to $7.4 billion in 1990,
with sales by domestic firms amounting to about 55% of the total. See Faturamento da
indzstria de informhtica na decada de 80 (Growth of the Informatics Industry during the
Eighties), FOLHA DE SAo PAULO, June 16, 1991, § 1 at 6.
189. Interview with Zeke Wimert, supra note 177. In the United States, an analogous
situation exists with shareware, software which can be copied or downloaded from on-line
services and paid for only after the user has sampled it. Clay Andres, Shareware: It's a
Good Find, MACWEEK, Nov. 9, 1992, at 73. Despite its low price, many large corporations
refuse to use it, feeling that the cost of providing support, documentation, and virus protec-
tion outweighs the value of the software. Id. at 73-74.
190. Draft Law No. 997 of May 21, 1991, art. 2 [hereinafter 1991 Draft Software Law]
(on file with author).
191. This change will likely produce scholarly debate in Brazil as to whether it is an
isolated concession to the realities of the software market or part of a broader movement
away from the civil law system's view of authors' rights.
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B. Market Reserve Provisions: The Similarity Test and Na-
tional Distributor Requirement
While most software vendors and foreign commentators wel-
comed the copyright provisions of the software law, they reacted
negatively to the market reserve provisions, especially the similar-
ity test.192 There were widespread fears that the absence of a de-
tailed definition of similarity1 93 would be used to exclude foreign
software from the market.
These fears have not materialized. Foreign software has
flooded into Brazil, 9 and the SEI's application of the similarity
test has generated real controversy in only two cases.195 While the
posting process has been a modest bureaucratic impediment to for-
eign firms and their local distributors, it has not substantively af-
fected the market. Similarly, although the local distributor require-
ment has been inconvenient for some foreign firms, particularly
those with very sophisticated products designed for integrating
PCs with mainframes, it has not visibly hindered expansion of the
software market as a whole. 196 Furthermore, in the area of distribu-
tion, Brazil has largely met the legislative goal of enhancing do-
mestic competence in the informatics fields. Many domestic dis-
tributors are now strong enough to compete successfully with
foreign firms in the open market. 97
1. The Similarity Test
a. Fears of Software Vendors
The MS-DOS controversy and the similarity requirement in
the software law led to fears that foreign software would be ex-
cluded from the market, or at least included only after an arduous
case-by-case fight.' 98 In an attempt to defuse these concerns, the
192. See Brazil Legislators Vote, supra note 97, at 20 (quoting a Reagan administra-
tion trade official who described the software law as "still too vague and untransparent");
White, supra note 5, at 602-03; BENDER, supra note 14, § 3B.04, at 4 ("The bill seems to
embody some unusual and ambiguous provisions."); Brazil's President Vetoes, supra note
100, at 12.
193. Ivo Dawnay, Pressure Grows on Brazil to Lift Computer Curbs, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 16, 1988, at 5.
194. Brazil-Computer Software Market, supra note 38.
195. See Access to Brazil's Software Market, supra note 169, at 392.
196. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
197. See id.; see also supra note 30.
198. Some observers thought that the SEI would not permit foreign software into the
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Brazilian government arranged a series of meetings in early 1988
between Brazilian and American businesses and Brazilian govern-
ment officials."9
b. Administration of the Similarity Test
Despite concerns over potential problems in the administra-
tion of the law, foreign software firms submitted many applications
for posting programs with the SEI and virtually all of them were
accepted without incident.2 00 Since the law was inaugurated, the
SEI has denied posting to very few of the foreign programs.2 0 1
During the first years using the similarity test, the SEI re-
jected two programs that are worth discussing: Novell's Netware
and Ashton-Tate's DBase 111.2 12 The SEI rejected Novell's applica-
tion for posting Netware based on its similarity to Ampliware 2.0,
a Brazilian networking product. Novell claimed that its Netware
country. Even after CONIN's decision to overturn the SEI's disapproval of posting for MS-
DOS, some thought that the SEI was waiting for an opportunity to reject software vendors
who, unlike Microsoft, could not count on the constant, aggressive support of the U.S. gov-
ernment. White, supra note 5, at 591; see also, Julia Michaels & Roger Cohen, Brazil's Shift
an Electronics Imports Sparks Interest of Foreign Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1989,
at A19 ("a more rigid approach could still return").
199. Citing Progress, supra note 106. "Brazilian Ambassador Marcilio Marques Moreira
said Feb. 8 in Atlanta that he was confident that recent meetings . . . could produce a
solution to the informatics [section 301] case 'within the next few days, if not hours.'" Id.
200. See also Michaels & Cohen, supra note 198, at A19.
201. As of October 1989, only 23 of 2,700 programs had been denied posting. Some of
the rejections were subsequently reversed by CONIN. Access to Brazil's Software Market,
supra note 169, at 392-93. The pattern of overwhelming approvals has continued. Brazilian
President Proposes, supra note 9, at 373. The American Consulate in Sao Paulo describes
market access as "relatively barrier free .... The great majority of foreign software . . .
subject to the similarity test [has] been approved for distribution in the country." Bra-
zil-Computer Software Market, supra note 38.
202. Access to Brazil's Software Market, supra note 169, at 392. AT&T's UNIX oper-
ating system was kept off the market until 1989 by disputes related to the informatics law.
UNIX is distinguished from most other operating systems in that it is "open," a sort of
cooperative effort among its sponsors. In contrast to proprietary operating systems, where
manufacturers are free to modify operating system software so it will operate exclusively on
their machines, AT&T's technology transfer agreement for UNIX requires manufacturers
and developers to release enhancements they make to the system back to AT&T. The result
is that all UNIX work stations made by all manufacturers worldwide should be able to run
the same software, in contrast to the situation in other operating environments, where for
example, software for a Data General computer will not operate on a Digital Equipment or
IBM computer. The requirement to license back improvements, however, conflicted with
provisions of the informatics law which deny licensors the right to restrict adaptation or
marketing of transferred technology by licensees. Sao Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6
Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30. A discussion of this problem (using Spain as a case study) is
found at Mensik, supra note 127, at 8-10.
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was a far more sophisticated product than Ampliware. It argued
that the SEI's testing of the product was tainted203 and that the
comparison with Ampliware was unfair because Ampliware had not
been posted.204
Less than six months later, however, the SEI approved a sub-
sequent version of Netware for posting. Eduardo Strazzieri, Opera-
tions Director of one of Novell's Brazilian distributors, attributed
the approval to Novell's improved preparation for the testing pro-
cedure and to a general improvement in the political climate for
free trade brought about by the election of Brazilian President,
Fernando Collor de Mello: "This time we used the right sort of
machines, the right sort of environment. . . .Collor was. . . good
...for us, because he [stressed] day by day that he is absolutely
against the market reserve."2 5
The other program that the SEI refused to post was a
database program by Ashton-Tate. After the 1987 Software Law
passed, Ashton-Tate successfully applied for several programs to
be posted in Brazil, including the latest release of its flagship
database program, DBase iV. in the wake of DBase iV's relative
lack of commercial success worldwide, and the continuing brisk
sales of its predecessor, DBase III, Ashton-Tate applied for posting
for DBase III.20 The SEI rejected the application in a curious, ap-
parently political decision. Although the initial notes prepared by
the SEI's testing lab accepted the product after finding it dissimi-
lar to existing national software, the SEI reversed the evaluation
and denied the program posting.
2" CONIN upheld the decision.
208
Apparently Ashton-Tate unintentionally stumbled onto one of
the chief fears of the proponents of Brazil's market reserve: that
foreign companies would "dump" antiquated products in Brazil.
Although Ashton-Tate's motivation for launching DBase III in
Brazil does not fit the stereotype of a multinational firm dumping
an outdated program on a developing country, the SEI's treatment
203. The SEI's engineers were unable to make Netware perform to specification be-
cause of equipment incompatibilities. Similarly, the SEI tested Novell's product on "unfa-
miliar and unapproved computer equipment, which produced substandard performance of
the software." Access to Brazil's Software Market, supra note 195, at 392.
204. Id. at 391.
205. Brazilian Informatics Agency Authorizes Sales of U.S. Novell Networking
Software, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 270 (Feb. 21, 1990).
206. Interview with Manoel J. Pereira dos Santos, supra note 165.
207. Sgo Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30.
208. Interview with Manoel J. Pereira dos Santos, supra note 165.
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of the firm served as an example to other firms in the informatics
sector.2 0 9 The political nature of the decision is reinforced by the
fact that the SEI subsequently permitted Ashton-Tate to post a
program functionally equivalent to DBase III without incident. '
Even taking these rejections into account, it is safe to say that
the fear that the similarity test would be a significant barrier to
the introduction of foreign software did not materialize. Although
the posting system delays the introduction of software into the
market for several months, approval in most cases is routine. Even
in exceptional cases where there is local opposition, as there was
against Netware, firms attuned to Brazilian informatics policy can
expect approval. Likewise, concerns that the three year posting pe-
riod would serve as an invitation for Brazilian firms to copy Ameri-
can software and then corner the market by having renewal of the
American product blocked 21 1 have not materialized because in Bra-
zil's computer and software marketplace, major products are up-
graded annually or semi-annually and are competitively priced." '1
American commentary, both journalistic and legal, exhibited
what seems in retrospect to be excessive concerns over these provi-
sions. For example, one law review article written a year after the
passage of the 1987 Software Law concedes that the SEI construed
the similarity provisions liberally, but then depicts a range of sce-
narios where the SEI might backtrack and administer the law in-
equitably. 13 The article points to the three year posting period as
one of these opportunities. " While the government of Brazil is ca-
pable of arbitrary behavior and of reversing its administrative de-
cisions,"5 the assumption that it will do so has proven to be
incorrect.
The twenty-five year copyright limit and three year posting
period of the 1987 Software Law could have only a marginal influ-
209. Sao Paulo interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 30; interview
with Georges Fischer, supra note 30.
210. Interview with Manoel J. Pereira dos Santos, supra note 165.
211. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 66, at 699, arguing for a minimum period of five
to ten years.
212. Louise Kehoe, Big Blue Decides Small is Beautiful, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 23,
1992, at 23. IBM's vice-president and General Manager of Personal Systems, James Can-
navino, cites PC product cycles of "six to eight months" as one of the motivating factors for
IBM's decision to spin off its personal computer operations to an independent subsidiary.
Id.
213. White, supra note 5, at 591, 601-03.
214. Id. at 603.
215. Examples include domestic economic shocks and international debt moratoria.
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ence in a field where products are updated on a regular basis. Al-
though the time limits can be regarded as symbolic of hidden agen-
das, their practical significance is low.
Likewise, the possibility of the SEI "increas[ing] its political
strength" '16  and reversing its practice of approving foreign
software will remain low unless there is a very marked change in
the business and political landscape. Because Brazilian firms have
incorporated significant amounts of foreign software into their sys-
tems, they have a strong interest in maintaining an open, stable
market in foreign software. A policy reversal would significantly in-
convenience local users of foreign software, whose numbers are
growing rapidly. Because technological and price developments are
so rapid in the informatics market, an open market is desirable. It
is hard to see where the pressure necessary to force such a reversal
would come from.217
Although generalizations are difficult, there is a perception in
the United States that Brazil is a sort of "chief of the banana re-
publics," recklessly engaging in economic shocks and protectionist
maneuvers. This perception may lead to overly broad predictions
of administrative arbitrariness. In the case of informatics at least,
when foreign firms are discriminated against, it is not simply a
matter of general principle, but rather a result of rational, if not
always palatable, factors.218
While this Article and most commentary on the 1987 Software
Law have focused on potential problems with the law from the per-
spective of software vendors and free market advocates, 19 it is
worth noting that the similarity test has not directly benefited
Brazilian software authors. Consequently, no foreign software has
been barred, and therefore the goal of the market reserve to de-
velop a national software industry has proved to be illusory. 20
216. White, supra note 5, at 603.
217. This is particularly true in software. Brazilian software firms seem largely to have
acquiesced to liberal administration of the law. Software firms are not as potent political
forces as are hardware manufacturers.
218. See supra part IV.C (contrasting important factors in opening software markets
with hardware markets, which remained closed for several years).
219. American business is most concerned with the impact of Brazilian law on Ameri-
can exporters, and there is little discussion in the American literature about the develop-
ment of the Brazilian informatics industry.
220. For example, the financial support, educational assistance, and training centers
which article 15 of the 1987 Software Law envisions were largely a dead letter when articles
16 to 22-the 200% levy on foreign software that would have funded them-were vetoed by
President Sarney. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, arts. 15-20, 51 LEx at 908, translated
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This result has not gone entirely unnoticed in Brazil, as pro-
posals to institute a 200% tax on certain foreign software are peri-
odically reintroduced in Congress. To date, the proposals have not
made progress, and they seem unlikely to do so in the near future.
Though the 1987 Software Law has had limited success in de-
veloping successful Brazilian software packages, the law has been
more successful in developing an infrastructure of programmers
and support personnel. In today's market, software is not a magi-
cal, stand alone product. Because users often demand support and
require customized programming, programmers who had started
writing programs with the intent of pre-empting foreign software
were able to adjust their plans to individualized customer require-
ments with less dislocation than hardware manufacturers could
when faced with the import flood.
c. Proposed Amendment Eliminating the Similarity Test and
Posting Requirement
The draft amendment to the 1987 Software Law now before
the Brazilian Congress would eliminate both the similarity test and
the posting requirement for foreign software.2 '
Although no serious opposition to the law has emerged, the
draft law has languished in Congress. This is probably more the
result of disharmony and poor relations between the Brazilian ex-
ecutive and legislative branches than any likelihood that there will
be backward movement in the informatics area. Since 1991, Brazil-
ian politics has reflected the conflict between that country's frac-
tious legislative branch and its authoritarian President who suf-
fered from an unsuccessful economic program, "2 ethical problems,
and impeachment.2 3 For significant periods of time, this conflict
has left non-essential legislation at a virtual standstill."2 4
in ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 364-65.
221. 1991 Draft Software Law, supra note 190, art. 12.
222. Regarding early friction between Collor and Congress, see Sam Dillon, Inflation
Fighter Changes His Tune, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 15, 1991, at C1, C3; Gary Marx, Economic
Grip Eludes Brazil Chief, Cm. TRm., Dec. 17, 1991, § 3, at 1.
223. Collor resigned on December 29, 1992, at the beginning of his impeachment trial
for charges stemming from an influence-peddling scandal. Christina Lamb, Brazil's Beached
Playboy Bows Out, FIN. TIMEs (London), Dec. 30, 1992, at 2.
224. On the day of Collor's resignation, Brazil's then Foreign Minister, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, commented, "This will now allow us to get on with governing the coun-
try." Bill Hinchberger, Collor Resigns as Senate Starts Key Session in Impeachment Trial,
FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 30, 1992, at 10.
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Despite President Collor's shortcomings and this generally un-
productive political and economic climate, Collor led a broad initi-
ative to liberalize Brazil's trade policy. Brazilian and foreign com-
mentators have cited this as his lasting contribution to the nation
and feel that this trend will not be reversed. This trend was
marked in informatics, where many joint ventures have been ap-
proved22 5 and the hardware market reserve was softened.22 All
these changes bode well for passage of the amendment when politi-
cal tensions subside.
2. National Distributor Requirement
a. Impact of the Requirement
The requirement that foreign software vendors market their
products only through Brazilian distributors has had only limited
negative effects on vendors. Further, the requirement has created a
class of sophisticated Brazilian firms."2
The negative effects of the requirement have been 1 "'+fted to a
few areas. Most notably, the requirement makes it difficult to pro-
vide support for very sophisticated software or for software that
integrates with mainframe programs.22 Because the distributors
225. Foreign hardware firms announcing joint ventures or cooperative agreements with
Brazilian firms in 1991 included IBM, NCR, Hewlett Packard, Bull, and Digital Equipment
Co. Liberalization of Brazil Informatics Law, supra note 34. This trend continued into
1992. A 1992 list of hardware joint ventures with foreign firms compiled by the U.S. Consu-
late in SAo Paulo fills two single-spaced pages. Brazil-Inormatics Market Profile, 1992
National Trade Data Bank: Market Reports, Aug. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, NSAMER
Library, Brazil File.
226. Law No. 8,248, of Oct. 23, 1991, 55 LEx 695 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Informatics
law]. The new informatics legislation limited the market reserve starting October 29, 1992.
It allows for the importation of minicomputers and PCs and eases joint venture rules. As
long as 5% of sales are invested in Brazil for research and development, foreign partners
may hold up to 49% of voting capital in a joint venture company. Id. arts. 1, 11, 55 LEx at
695, 697.
227. Compucenter and MultiSolu oes represent examples of large and medium sized
software distributors. Compucenter sells the most popular lines of software to the general
business market. It was the first distributor for Microsoft in Brazil, and it also represents
WordPerfect, Borland, Oracle and Novell. Compucenter has over two hundred employees,
distributes mainframe and PC products, and has significant training, systems planning, and
installation divisions. Boston interview with Fernando Jos6 Fernandes, Jr., supra note 38.
As of 1990, Compucenter had sales of $23 million and 190 employees. 1991 SAo PAULO YEAR-
BOOK (American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil-SAo Paulo) 172.
MultiSoluvbes Inform~tica is representative of the mid-sized distributors who concen-
trate on market niches-in this case, graphics and publishing. See supra note 30.
228. Interview with Zeke Wimert, supra note 177.
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are non-exclusive, they frequently lack both an in-depth knowl-
edge of their programs and a compelling interest in the long-term
success of the product. They are less inclined to make the substan-
tial initial investment necessary to adequately support a complex
product. The situation for mainframe-PC integrated programs is
particularly awkward. A mainframe manufacturer can market
mainframe software, but must sell the complementary package for
PCs through a national distributor.2 29 Although these problems
have had a modest impact thus far, they may cause more serious
difficulties as Brazilian computing grows more sophisticated.2 30
One reason the law has generated relatively little controversy
is that consulting firms and the big six international public ac-
counting firms have circumvented the limitations on foreign firm
distribution and marketing by setting up Brazilian affiliate compa-
nies for software marketing and support.213 This is significant be-
cause most of the big six firms have a significant presence in
software sales, programming, and integration in Brazil.232
In general, vendor-distributor relationships have been produc-
tive, and using domestic distributors has helped firms adapt to
some of the challenges of doing business in Brazil. Given Brazil's
complex and rapidly changing economic climate and politicized in-
formatics regulatory environment, use of local distributors makes
economic sense for all but the largest and most sophisticated for-
eign companies. Other factors like language and distance from
home markets also encourage the use of local distributors.233
From the Brazilian point of view, the distributor provisions of
the law have been extremely successful. Not only have distributors
made money, but they appear well-established both commercially
and technically.234 Many have incorporated "value-adding" skills
like program development and system integration. These skills are
229. Id.
230. Id. In an effort to circumvent these problems several large American software
firms, including Microsoft, Lotus, WordPerfect, and Oracle, set up service and consulting
offices in Sao Paulo. Brazil-Computer Software Market, supra note 38.
231. Interview with Mario Fleck, supra note 142.
232. Id.
233. These factors are discussed in U.S. Firm Profits From Computer Openings in
South America, GLOBAL FIN. MARKETS, Oct. 21, 1991, available in Westlaw, BUS-INTL
Database, which profiles the success of Aldus, the American publisher of the popular pub-
lishing programs Pagemaker and Freehand, in marketing its software in Latin America.
MultiSoluv6es distributes Aldus's products in Brazil. See supra note 30.
234. See supra notes 30, 227.
1992]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
beneficial to the development of informatics generally and position
the firms for continued prosperity despite the fact that the market
for selling off-the-shelf software has become more competitive and
margins have dropped.2 3 5
b. Proposed Amendment to the National Distributor Provisions
of the Law
The proposed amendment to the software law would eliminate
the national distributor provisions."8 Foreign firms would be free
to distribute their products in Brazil and sell directly to end users.
Merchants would also be free to import software for sale without
having a distribution agreement with the manufacturer. Under the
present law, a distribution agreement approved by the SEI is a
prerequisite to the sale of software.
23 7
Although this amendment would appear to adversely affect
Brazilian distributors, it has not been actively opposed. Brazilian
informatics professionals f&. that the change wll not lead to sig
nificant changes in the present relationships between local distrib-
utors and foreign software vendors.2 38 Although vendors of special-
ized programs and a few firms with very high volume business may
find it preferable to set up their own distribution and support sys-
tems, most firms will not want to make the effort to adapt to Bra-
zil's complex business climate.23 9 In the few cases where business
volume might justify a vendor setting up its own distribution net-
work, margins have dropped to the point where distributors are
now less averse to losing the business. 40 Additionally, because
many distributors have now branched into higher value-adding ac-
tivities, they are less dependent on volume sales of off-the-shelf
products.2 41
235. Interview with Antonio Lapa Silveira, supra note 54; interview with Eduardo
Carvalho, supra note 30.
236. 1991 Draft Software Law, supra note 190, art. 12.
237. 1987 Software Law, supra note 13, art. 8, 51 LEx at 906-07, translated in ROSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 363.
238. Interview with Antonio Lapa Silveira, supra note 54; interview with Eduardo
Carvalho; supra note 30; interview with Zeke Wimert, supra note 177; interview with Mario
Fleck, supra note 142.
239. Interview with Antonio Lapa Silveira, supra note 54; interview with Eduardo
Carvalho, supra note 30.
240. Id. This is especially true for word processing and spreadsheet software.
241. See supra note 30 and text accompanying note 227.
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C. Application of the Software Market Experience to the
Hardware Market Reserve
Several factors contributed to the opening of the software
market: foreign political pressure; a constant demand for foreign
software; structural problems associated with maintaining a closed
market; and the acceptance of a liberal interpretation of the law by
organized parts of the informatics industry.
The aggressive advocacy of the United States for an open
software market obviously influenced the passage of the 1987
Software Law, as well as its subsequent application.24 The timing
of the introduction and passage of the 1987 Software Law and of
CONIN's reconsideration of the SEI's rejection of Microsoft's MS-
DOS license agreement were closely connected to developments in
the section 301 action. Given the close temporal relation of these
events, it would be foolish not to acknowledge the impact of U.S.
pressure. Fears of retaliation also played a part in the approval of
subsequent contested programs.
It is important, however, not to over-emphasize the role of the
United States in the law's passage. The section 301 action had twin
goals: opening both the software and hardware markets of Brazil.
Despite the vigor with which the United States pursued the action,
Brazil was able to sidestep changes to the hardware market reserve
until 1991.243
Pressure by users who needed foreign software for their busi-
nesses also contributed to the opening of the market. In a real
sense, users voted with their feet. Even before the market was
opened by legislative and official action, the use of foreign software
was widespread. Opening the market was partially a fait accompli,
with the law reflecting these changes.
Software is difficult to place within a market reserve. Software
242. See supra text accompanying notes 76-106.
243. In 1990 and 1991, the situation began to change because Brazilian hardware manu-
facturers sustained massive losses after years of profits. As the smuggling of hardware in-
creased and PC product development cycles dropped from five or more years to as little as
six months, leading Brazilian hardware firms felt that they had more to gain from joint
venture agreements. Such agreements enable them to incorporate up-to-date technology as
it is introduced in the United States and Japan.
The system of joint ventures, brokered by the government and nourished with tax in-
centives, is reminiscent of the development of other sectors in Brazil in the late sixties and
seventies by a triple alliance of government capital, private local capital, and multinational
firms. EVANS, supra note 17, at 11-12, 52-54, 236-49.
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is not a single product, but hundreds of diverse programs. It is eas-
ily copied and smuggled. Because using "market standard"
software yields dramatic advantages by allowing communication
between programs and reducing training time, a world market in
software has emerged. If a multinational firm uses Micrsoft Word,
WordPerfect, Lotus, and Microsoft Excel, it has a strong incentive
to use them in Brazil as well. For a national product to be competi-
tive in a business setting, it must offer competitive features and
near total compatibility to the world market standards.
Although some national or regional programs have succeeded
in making this leap, they have had the advantage of large domestic
markets, or greater financial support from either a parent com-
pany, or the government.2" The premise that with a market re-
serve Brazilian software developers could overcome all the handi-
caps necessary to compete with IBM, DEC, UNISYS, and
Computer Associates (for mainframe computer software), and
Microsoft, Lotus, WordPerfect, Ashton-Tate and Apple (for PCs)
was unsound-regardless of how much control the SEI could exert
O11 Lr, t l eV ,-
'
While both market participants and users pressured .for open-
ing the market, there was relatively little pressure to close the mar-
ket to foreign products as envisioned by the 1987 Software Law.
Even if the most restrictive draft of the software law had actually
become law, the software market reserve would still have been
more liberal than the hardware reserve. Although foreign software
244. Possible examples include the systems software market in Japan-the one market
where MS-DOS is not the dominant operating system ,for PCs-and the market for the
integrated spreadsheet, word-processing, and page layout program for the Macintosh, Rag-
time, which is a market leader in Europe, but almost unknown in the United States. In both
casei the regional markets are bigger and more affluent than those in Brazil. In Japan, the
dominant hardware manufacturer supporting the alternate operating system, NEC, operates
on a scale that dwarfs every industrial company in Brazil except Petrobrs.
245. With the possible exception of the United States, no country or computer manu-
facturer has been able to "go it alone" in software development. Software is an international
industry which has transcended national or corporate control. Even well-placed market
leaders like IBM and Apple have lost humiliating public showdowns with software suppliers.
IBM's effort to co-develop OS-2 with Microsoft as the successor to MS-DOS has been
largely derailed by Microsoft's unilateral development and marketing of its Windows oper-
ating system. T.R. Reid & Brit Hume, Microsoft Still Prospers Despite Industry's Woes,
CI. TRIBUNE, Mar. 8, 1992, § 7, at 4.
Similarly, Apple tried to reign in Adobe Systems, developers of the PostScript page
description language, by developing the rival TrueType system with Microsoft, only to back
down in the face of user resistance. Ken Siegmann, Challengers End Bid to Unseat Adobe
Technology, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 21, 1991, at C1.
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in the same category as Brazilian software, but not functionally
equivalent to it, would have been taxed at a high rate, it would
have been allowed on the market. 46 With hardware this is not the
case. For example, once production of Brazilian IBM PC clones
was authorized, all PCs-including MacIntoshes and functionally
superior PCs using the more sophisticated 386 chip-were banned
from the general market." 7
The relative weakness of domestic opposition toward the in-
troduction of foreign software has several possible explanations.
One is the idea, discussed above, that the arrival of foreign
software was inevitable, and therefore not worthy of vigorous op-
position. A second explanation is that relatively little previous in-
vestment by Brazilian entrepreneurs was jeopardized by letting
foreign software into Brazil. A third explanation is that although
software may be economically more important and productive than
computer hardware, it is popularly perceived as a less dramatic or
less important product, and therefore, less worthy of "defense." Fi-
nally, the idea of limiting distribution of software to national firms
provided a profitable, inexpensive point of entry to the informatics
market for Brazilian entrepreneurs. 4 8
The contrast with the hardware market was marked on nearly
every point. Computers signify modernization, progress, technical
sophistication, and power. Brazilian computer makers were well-
organized and included some of the country's most powerful busi-
ness and industrial groups."4 9 They frequently made substantial in-
vestments in facilities and engineering.25 Opinion in the industry
and in Congress was completely opposed to cooperating with for-
eign hardware makers. Except for a few diehard free market advo-
cates, there was a strong consensus for developing national tech-
nology. This understanding is demonstrated by the 1984
Informatics Law's prohibition on licensing of foreign technology.
2 51
Although as a practical matter there were breaches, like the copy-
246. See supra note 100. In its final form, the 1987 Software Law did not even impose
this extra tax on foreign software. Id.
247. 1984 Informatics Law, supra note 7, art. 22, 48 LEx at 540-41, translated in
ROSENN, supra note 7, app. XI at 356.
248. This would tend to lessen nationalist or entrepreneurial hostility to the law as it
provided easy entry to the industry.
249. The most obvious example is Itautec, which is affiliated with Brazil's second larg-
est-and most influential-private bank holding company.
250. See, e.g., supra notes 80, 88.
251. 1984 Informatics Law, supra note 7, 48 Lax at 540-41, translated in RoSENN,
supra note 7, app. XI at 356.
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ing of MS-DOS, 2" the idea that Brazil should have hardware de-
velopment capability was for many a political and business article
of faith.2 3
The initial success of the opening of the software market cre-
ated pressure for maintaining that openness and for liberalizing
the hardware market reserve. The rapid expansion of the software
market and the profitability of Brazilian distributors led many to
favor a free market in foreign software and hardware. Software dis-
tributors are dependent not only on software vendors, but also on
hardware manufacturers because purchases of new software are
closely tied to purchases of new computers. As a result, software
distributors are among the most ardent advocates for dismantling
the hardware market reserve. Likewise, users who have exper-
ienced the benefits of world-standard software are interested in ob-
taining up-to-date hardware products. Because Brazilian hardware
is expensive,5 4 and most Brazilian computers utilize technology in-
troduced in the United States several product generations earlier,
the sale of up-to-date computers at competitive prices would likely
cause - corresponding explosion in --1-- 1f isi-. s sotaeporJV~~il 0-pIJ u.31V1 111 itur, IJ l -e~ll  ware pro-
grams to allow users to take full advantage of the high-technology
hardware.
The success of software distributors demonstrated that coop-
252. See supra text accompanying note 76-106.
253. This situation has only changed relatively recently. In the last couple of years the
profitability of Brazilian computer manufacturers has plunged as sales have suffered from a
combination of recession, heightened competition, and user revolt at paying inflated prices
for obsolete computers (prices typically run 2.5 to 4 times U.S. prices). The leaders in the
market are looking for a solution which will give them access to better technology and a leg
up on their smaller competitors.
Support for protected, local development resurfaced briefly during the debate on Law
No. 8,248 of Oct. 21, 1991, the 1991 Informatics Law, when Luis Henrique, a leader of the
largest party in Congress (PMDB) and head of the House Science and Technology Commit-
tee, proposed restrictive amendments to the law. They would have denied foreign firms in-
formatics tax deductions and the ability to bid on government contracts and would have
required foreign firms to export 50% of their production and invest 8% of their profits in
research and development activities. Orestes Quercia, head of the PMDB, former Governor
of Sao Paulo, cracked the whip and reversed the party's position, enabling the law to clear
the House. Christina Lamb, Collor Wins Victory on Information Technology, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 27, 1991, at 6.
254. "Computador nacional & gata par lebre" reclama indzstria (Industry Complains
Brazilian Computers are Cats not Leopards), FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, June 23, 1991, § 1 at 13
("obsolete and twice as expensive as imports"); Christina Lamb, A Protectionist Virus in
Brazil's Computer Plans, FIN. TIMES (London), July 23, 1991, at 3 (science Minister says




eration in informatics was fruitful. Since early 1991, joint ventures
between foreign and Brazilian firms have dominated the market.
2 55
The dominant world-wide computer manufacturers provide cur-
rent technology, while local computer firms provide manufacturing
facilities, hire staff, and market the products in Brazil. As a result,
foreign firms enter Brazil with an established market share and an
established sales force. 56 In exchange, Brazilian firms get a sure-
fire product and access to world-class technology. The joint ven-
tures should be profitable in the short term and Brazil's economy
will benefit from the technological upgrade. Both sides have the
ability to position themselves for the future. The international
firms will increase their market penetration and have a chance to
campaign for the free importation of computers from their more
efficient production centers. 5 " Brazilian firms can opt to drop de-
velopment activities completely and earn profits from distributing
a respected nameplate, or use their access to better technology to
develop a niche in designing and manufacturing high-end machines
for export or for sale to more sophisticated domestic customers."'
V. CONCLUSION
Brazil's software market has become more open and more sta-
ble since the passage of the 1987 Software Law. Although the law
incorporates some bureaucratic obstacles and requires the use of
Brazilian distributors-to the modest disadvantage of vendors of
foreign software"'5 -these drawbacks are far outweighed by the
gains generated by the law. Market opportunities for foreign
255. Several critical joint ventures were announced in the spring and summer of 1991.
After passage of the 1991 Informatics Law, the trickle became a deluge. See supra note 225.
256. The larger, politically well-connected Brazilian firms have already tied up the most
prominent foreign partners. See supra note 225. The announcement of the joint venture
between IBM and SID Electronica to make PCs illustrates this clout. The deal was an-
nounced with considerable fanfare by then President Collor at SID's behest long before
IBM had agreed to it. It took several months to actually work out an agreement to conse-
crate the shotgun marriage. Interview with Zeke Wimert, supra note 177.
257. Consolidation of manufacturing sites is an important trend in computer manufac-
turing. Most computer makers are consolidating their manufacturing to one or a few large,
highly automated plants worldwide. It is an open question whether Brazilian satellite plants
can be competitive over the long term. Except for PCs, volumes produced will be low.
258. Interview with Felipe Gomez P~rez, supra note 82. A number of firms in Taiwan
(Acer, for example) and Korea have taken the "high end" route. Acer is particularly apt for
Brazilian firms because it has specialized in niche markets in developing countries, including
South America. Luisetta Mudle, Profile: Acer Keyed Up for the World Stage, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 9, 1992, at 27.
259. See supra part III.B.
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software vendors have expanded dramatically and the copyright
protection the law affords has proven to be adequate for firms
seeking to prevent piracy. "Gray area" transactions-illegal copy-
ing by distributors or corporate users, off-the-books transactions,
and parallel market remittances-are the exception today. Fur-
thermore, the revisions to the software law now before the Brazil-
ian Congress would remove those provisions which are most objec-
tionable to foreign firms.
The law's market reserve provisions have provided few bene-
fits to Brazilian software authors. This, however, has caused only a
very modest reaction, probably because the rapid expansion of the
overall informatics market has opened greater work opportunities
for programmers. At the same time, the law's requirement that
software be distributed by Brazilian firms has fostered the growth
of companies which are not only profitable, but also technically so-
phisticated. These firms form a constituency in favor of an open
informatics market and serve as an illustration that less drastic
forms of market reserve can be beneficial for Brazilian informatics
companies.
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